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Abstract 
We argue that social capital as proxied by trust increases aggregate productivity by affecting the organization of 
firms.  To  do  this  we  collect  new  data  on  the  decentralization  of  investment,  hiring,  production,  and  sales 
decisions from Corporate Headquarters to local plant managers in almost 4,000 firms in the United States, 
Europe, and Asia. We find that firms headquartered in high trust regions are more likely to decentralize, with 
trust accounting for about half of the variation in decentralization in our data. To help identify causal effects, we 
look  within  multinational  firms,  and  show  that  higher  levels  of  bilateral  trust  between  the  multinational’s 
country of origin and subsidiary’s country of location increases decentralization, even after instrumenting trust 
using religious and ethnic similarities between the countries. Trust raises aggregate productivity through two 
channels: (1) trust facilitates reallocation between firms by allowing more efficient firms to grow as CEOs can 
decentralize more decisions and (2) trust complements the adoption of new technologies, thereby increasing 
productivity within firms during times of rapid technological change. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Economists have become  increasingly aware of the importance of culture on international 
performance (e.g. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2006). One influential line of research argues that 
social capital, usually proxied by measures of social trust, fosters faster growth (e.g. Knack and 
Keefer, 1997 or La Porta, et al., 1997). The mechanisms through which this might happen are not 
fully understood, however. In this paper we present evidence that high social capital in an area 
increases decentralized decision making within firms. We show that this decentralization favors 
productivity through supporting larger equilibrium firm size and by increasing the returns to 
information technology. 
 
We develop a model building on Garicano (2000) to analyze how trust affects the organization of 
firms. The CEO can either solve production problems directly or delegate these to plant managers. 
When trust is high, plant managers tend to solve problems “correctly” (rather than, for example, 
stealing from the firm) so that CEOs are more likely to delegate. Further, by delegating the CEO can 
leverage his ability over a larger  team which  leads  to larger firm size.  Finally, we  show how 
technologies that aid information acquisition by managers (IT) will make delegation particularly 
effective. We take these three predictions to the data and find support from the hypotheses that trust 
increases decentralization, raises firm size, and complements IT to raise productivity. 
 
Our paper subjects the “organizational” view of social capital to rigorous econometric investigation 
and concludes that trust is critical to the ability of a firm to decentralize. We show that trust in a 
region (even after controlling for country dummies) is associated with much more decentralized 
decision making. To probe whether this effect is causal, we exploit the fact that some of our data is 
drawn from multinational subsidiaries. We find that the level of trust prevalent in the country where 
the multinational is headquartered has a strong positive correlation with decentralization in the 
affiliate’s foreign location: in California a multinational affiliate from Sweden (a high trust country) 
would typically be more decentralized than a multinational affiliate from India (a low trust country). 
We further show this is driven by the level of bilateral trust between countries, which seems to 
affect not only flows of trade and investment between countries (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 
2009), but also the internal organization of multinationals.  Crucially, the effect of trust on 
decentralization is present even when we instrument bilateral trust with measures of religious and 
somatic distance between countries, which are arguably exogenous to the firm.   3 
 
Countries that find decentralization more costly may suffer lower welfare for at least two reasons. 
First, it will be difficult for more efficient firms to grow large. Penrose (1959) and Chandler (1962) 
argued that decentralization was essential for the creation of large firms, because CEOs are time 
constrained over the number of decisions they can make. As firms grow large and more complex 
CEOs need to increasingly decentralize decision making power to their senior management. In our 
data we find that larger firms are indeed significantly more decentralized and that high trust regions 
are able to sustain firms of large equilibrium size. This is important because for capital and labor to 
be effectively reallocated across firms, productive firms need to grow large and take market share 
from unproductive firms. This reallocation is a major factor driving growth in developed countries 
like the United States.
1
 
  But in developing countries like India, where firms are typically quite 
centralized, average firm size is smaller, so that the most productive firms have a smaller market 
share (see, for example, Hsieh and Klenow, 2009). 
The second mechanism linking trust and productivity is that low trust economies will have a larger 
proportion of centralized firms and industries. If there is a shock that increases the need for 
decentralization, then such countries will be at a disadvantage. There seems to have been a global 
trend towards more decentralization, which may be related to increasing competition (Guadalupe 
and Wulf, 2010), the supply of human capital (Caroli and Van Reenen, 2001), and/or the growth of 
information technology (Bresnahan, Brynjolffson, and Hitt, 2002). In support of the IT idea we 
present evidence from production functions that IT is complementary with decentralization. We 
estimate that the accelerated growth of computer capital since 1995 means that regions with one 
standard deviation more decentralization have an extra 0.5 percentage point annual productivity 
growth. 
 
Our analysis is focused on a novel dataset providing detailed information on the internal 
organization of firms across nations. The economic theory of organization has made great strides in 
the last two decades in furthering our understanding of activities within the boundary of the firm,
2
                                                 
1 See, for example, Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001 and 2006) who show that about 50% of productivity growth in 
manufacturing and about 90% in retail comes from reallocation. 
 
2 For a surveys see Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) or Gibbons and Roberts (forthcoming). One branch of the literature 
investigates conditions under which delegated contracting replicates efficient centralized contracting, for example Baron 
and Besanko (1992) and Melumad et al. (1995). However, this required complete contracts (see Mookherjee, 2006). A 
second branch emphasizes information processing and communication costs such as Sah and Stiglitz (1986), 
Genakopolos and Milgrom (1991), Radner (1993), Radner and Van Zandt (1992), Bolton and Dewatripont (1994), and 
Garicano (2000). A third branch, closest to our perspective, emphasizes the tradeoff between information and loss of 
   4 
but empirical research on this has lagged far behind because of a lack of organizational data. The 




 We address this lacuna by analyzing data on the organization of almost 4,000 firms across 
twelve countries in Europe, North America, and Asia. We designed and collected this data using a 
new survey tool and measure the decentralization of investment, hiring, production, and pricing 
decisions from the central headquarters (CHQ/CEO) to plant managers. This data reveals startling 
differences in the cross-country decentralization of firms: those in the United States and Northern 
Europe appear to be the most decentralized and those in Southern Europe and Asia the most 
centralized. The survey also includes detailed questions on management practices modeled as in 
Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) which enables us to control for managerial ability, a possible omitted 
variable that could be correlated with both greater decentralization and higher trust. 
Our paper links to several literatures. First, there are papers examining the impact of social capital. 
La Porta et al. (1997) found in cross-country regressions that the combined size of the largest 25 
public quoted firms was positively correlated to trust. Guiso et al. (2009) examine the role of trust in 
explaining patterns of economic exchange (including FDI flows) between countries. In a similar 
spirit, Bottazzi et al. (2010) study the importance of cultural factors in explaining flows of venture 
capital investments across countries. Although our work builds on this literature, a key distinction is 
the disaggregation of our analysis. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper looking at the 
role of trust (and culture) on  the organizational structure of firms  across multiple countries, as 
opposed to country level relationships. 
 
Second, we link to an emerging literature in trade on multinationals and comparative advantage. 
Helpman et al. (2004), Burstein and Monge-Naranjo (2009), and Antras et al. (2008) emphasize the 
importance of firm-level comparative advantage in multinationals. In these models firms have some 
productivity advantage, typically deriving from a different managerial or organizational technology, 
which their multinationals transplant to their overseas affiliates. Our evidence on the transplanting of 
multinational’s domestic organizational practices abroad provides empirical support for this 
assumption. 
                                                                                                                                                                   
control—see Aghion and Tirole (1997), Rajan and Zingales (2001), Dessein (2002), Hart and Moore (2005) and Alonso, 
Dessein, and Matouschek (2008). 
3 On single industry studies see Baker and Hubbard (2003, 2004) on trucks or Garicano and Hubbard (2007) on legal 
services. For cross industry studies of firms see for example, Acemoglu et al. (2007) on France and the United Kingdom; 
Colombo and Delmastro (2004)  and Kastl, Martimort, and Piccolo (2008) on  Italy;  Marin and Verdier (2008)  on 
Germany and Austria and Rajan and Wulf (2006) for the United States.   5 
 
Finally, we link to the literature on the “transportation” of culture by individuals across countries. 
For example, Fisman and Miguel (2007) show that the parking fine behaviour of diplomats in New 
York is strongly predicted by indices of corruption in their home countries.
4
 
 Our evidence suggests 
that firms also take part of their “culture” abroad. Interestingly, this holds even in multinationals 
when all the managers come from the country of location, suggesting that firms offer a mechanism 
for transporting culture across countries in additional to individual migration. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II sketches a simple model of trust and organizational 
structure  and its empirical implications, Section III details the data,  and Section IV has some 
descriptive statistics. The empirical results on the effect of trust on decentralization (and size) are 




II.A A Model of trust and decentralization 
Our starting point is the models of Garicano (2000) and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2007) on the 
hierarchical organization of expertise. Firms have to solve production decisions to generate output. 
Decisions are made at the lowest hierarchical level at which an agent is able to make them. In 
determining their hierarchical organization firms face a trade-off between information acquisition 
costs  (a)  and  communication  (“helping”)  costs  (h). Making decisions at lower levels implies 
increasing the cognitive burden of agents at those levels. For example, decentralizing from the CEO 
to plant managers over the decision whether to invest in new equipment requires training plant 
managers to discount cash flows using the appropriate cost of capital to compare these to the cost of 
investment. To the extent that the plant manager is unable to make this decision, it will be passed up 
to the corporate headquarters. But this increases communication costs in the hierarchy as the plant 
manager will have to explain some of the details behind the potential investment project and after 
solving the problem the CEO will have to explain what the manager must do. Thus, the extent of 
decentralization depends on the optimal trade-off between knowing versus asking for directions. 
 
                                                 
4  In the social domain, Fernandez and  Fogli  (2009)  and Giuliano (2007)  show that fertility rates among second-
generation Americans are correlated with fertility in the countries of their parents. And Ichino and Maggi (2000) study 
absenteeism and misconduct of employees at an Italian bank, and find that region of origin within Italy predicts shirking.   6 
We extend the Garicano (2000) model by adding the idea of trust. The CEO may not trust the 
manager’s decision because of misaligned incentives—for example she may worry about the plant 
manager taking bribes from equipment sellers.
5 If the CEO does not trust the plant manager to take 
the right action there will be less decentralization. This allows us to analyze the effect of trust on 
firm size. We show that firm size is increasing in the CEO’s trust in the plant manager. This is 
because a CEO will employ more plants managers when she is able to delegate decision making 




Production: Firms are comprised of a CEO and an endogenous set of production plants, each with a 
single plant manager. These production plants draw management problems z from the interval [0,1] 
each period. Production at each plant only takes place if all of these problems are solved, otherwise 
nothing is produced. We normalize to 1 the unit of output per plant per time period if production 
problems are solved. The frequency of these management problems is denoted by f(z) with a 
corresponding cumulative distribution of F(z). Optimality requires that the plant managers learn the 
common problems and asks about the exceptions, we thus reverse sort the problems in frequency 
order, so f′(z) < 0. 
 
Managers: All managers have a priori the same cost of acquiring information, α, which we label 
“management skill.” So, for example, if the firm trains plant managers to solve zM (where 0 < zM< 1) 
management problems then this costs αzM. If a plant manager draws a problem he cannot solve he 
passes it up to the CEO at a communication cost h per problem denoted in terms of management 
time. Total costs are reduced if employees are trained to deal with the common problems, but pass 
up the rare problems. This is the “management by exception” model.  
 
Trust: We also assume that even after acquiring formal knowledge plant managers only behave in 
the “correct way” to perform λ tasks and fail to correctly perform (1- λ) tasks. Here λ reflects the fact 
that the plant manager may have private benefits from doing the “wrong” action. Empirically we 
will use measures of trust to proxy shifts in the λ parameter. We view variations in λ across countries 
as reflecting CEO perceptions of differences in the preferences for taking appropriate actions. For 
example, we assume that CEOs believe that Swedish plant managers would be less likely to accept a 
                                                 
5 Alternatively, it may be more a question of ability—the plant manager may not be trusted to take the correct decision 
because even if he has acquired the formal knowledge to do the task (e.g. through training) he might still make a 
mistake. 
6 Garicano (2000) shows under general conditions a larger span between the CEO and plant manager will be replicated 
down the hierarchy, so firm size will be monotonically increasing in the number of plant managers per CEO.   7 
bribe (Sweden is a high trust country) to buy an overpriced piece of equipment than Indian plant 
managers (India is a low trust country). As such the variations in λ reflect variations in beliefs over 
individual plant manager’s utility functions arising from different levels of social capital. 
 
Firm organization: The principal hires some agents who must be trained to deal with tasks up to 
point zM  and pass the remaining (less frequently occurring) management problems up to the 
principal, which in this two-layer model is assumed to be the CEO. 
 
In each particular case, production per problem is as follows  
(1)                                       𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝐹(𝑧𝑀)𝜆 + �1 − 𝐹(𝑧𝑀)� 
 = 1 − 𝐹(𝑧𝑀)(1 − 𝜆) 
where the first term 𝐹(𝑧𝑀)𝜆 on the top row reflects the share of problems solved by the plant 
manager times the probability they correctly solve them, and the second term 1 − 𝐹(𝑧𝑀) reflects the 
share of problems passed up to the CEO (who we assume without loss of generality can correctly 
solve all problems). Thus if 𝜆=1, the plant manager can be trusted and production proceeds correctly 
with probability=1. 
 
The CEO takes h units of time to communicate and solve each referred problem. The problem of the 
principal is to maximize the firm’s profits, V, by choosing decentralization (𝑧𝑀) and the number of 
plant managers (n): 
(2)                          𝑉 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑧𝑀,𝑛
[(1 − 𝐹(𝑧𝑀)(1 − 𝜆))𝑛 − 𝗼𝑧𝑀𝑛 − 𝜔𝑛]                    ] 
(3)                                                       𝑠𝑡       �1 − 𝐹(𝑧𝑀)�𝑛ℎ = 1 
where the CEO is the residual claimant and receives the profits obtained after paying wage 𝜔 to the 
plant managers—their outside utility.  Equation (3) follows from the time constraint of the CEO, 
who has 1 unit of time in total to solve all the (1 − F(zM)) referred problems at a time cost of h per 
problem. The cost of delegating more problems is twofold: lower level managers need to be trusted, 
as they may not perform adequately; and second they need to be trained to deal with more problems. 
 
Decentralization:  Solving the constrained maximization  problem gives an equation implicitly 
defining the optimal degree of decentralization: 
(4)                                                               
𝜆−ωL
𝗼 = 𝑧𝑀 +
�1−𝐹(𝑧𝑀)�
𝑓(𝑧𝑀)  
   8 
And from first order condition (4) we derive the main prediction from our model: 
 
Proposition 1: Higher trust leads to more decentralization 
An increase in trust (λ rises) is associated with a higher degree of decentralization (zM),  
𝜕𝑧𝑀
𝜕𝜆 > 0 
where the positive sign is because 𝑓′(𝑧𝑀)<0 due to tasks being sorted in reverse frequency order. 
The intuition for proposition 1 is straightforward—if the CEO trusts plant managers she believes that 
the marginal returns from letting them handle tasks is greater as more problems are solved correctly. 
 
An interesting corollary of equation (4) is that higher plant manager skill (indexed by a lower value 
of 𝗼, the cost of acquiring knowledge) leads to greater decentralization: 
(5)                                                             𝜕𝑧𝑀/𝜕𝗼 < 0 
The intuition here is the more skilled the plant manager is at solving problems, the more decisions 
the CEO will delegate to him.
7
 
 Although we have no formal test of equation (5) as we do not have 
an instrument for skill supply, this correlation is present in the data and we generally control for 
human capital in the estimation of the decentralization equation. 
Size: The second key result relates to size. We derive the relationship between the number of plant 
managers that work with the CEO in equilibrium, which is from equation (2): 
𝑛∗ = 1/[�1 − 𝐹(𝑧𝑀)�ℎ] 
By combining this with proposition 1 we can establish our second proposition. 
 
Proposition 2: Higher trust increases firm size 
An increase in trust (λ) is associated with a larger firm size 𝑛∗  
𝜕𝑛∗ /𝜕𝜆 > 0 
The intuition is that higher trust allows the CEO to delegate more decisions, so she is able to spend 
less time helping any individual plant manager. Thus the CEO is able to employ more plant 
managers and expand the size of the firm. Trust essentially allows talented CEOs to leverage their 
managerial ability over a greater number of employees, and is similar to increasing the managerial 
leverage parameter in Lucas (1978).
8
                                                 
7 The complementarity between skills and decentralization is broadly consistent with the findings of Caroli and Van 
Reenen (2001) and Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002). 
 
8 LaPorta et al. (1997) also noted that repeated interactions are a substitute for trust and make large organizations harder 
to sustain in low-trust environments. Hart and Holmstrom (2010) present a model where plant managers may “shade” if 
they feel aggrieved by the CHQ, which will also tend to reduce delegation in low trust environments.   9 
 
This  result  links with the early literature on firm size, which also focused on the issue of 
decentralization as the key determinant of firm growth. For example, Penrose (1959) developed the 
“resource based” view of the firm, claiming that managerial capacity was a key resource in 
determining firm size. If senior management time could be leveraged across a larger group of plant 
managers, then firm size could be increased. Chandler (1962) examined the growth of large U.S. 
multi-divisional firms after the 1850s. He argued that these larger firms were created through setting 
up “local field units,” regional factories or sales-outlets, with decentralized power from the 
headquarters. Again, decentralization was necessary to allow distant units to operate, since limits on 
communication prevented the CEO from directing managers operating hundreds of miles away. 
Without decentralization these firms would have not been able to grow. 
 
Productivity and information technology: The maximized surplus in the firm is:  
(6)                                       𝑉 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑧𝑀,𝑛
[(1 − 𝐹(𝑧𝑀)(1 − 𝜆))𝑛 − 𝗼𝑧𝑀𝑛 − 𝜔𝑛 
= �




Applying the envelope condition yields the result that surplus is increasing in firm size.
9
(7)                                                    
𝜕𝑉∗
𝜕𝜆 = 𝐹(𝑧𝑀)/[ℎ�1 − 𝐹(𝑧𝑀)�] > 0  
 
 




 Better IT allows plant managers agents to solve problems more easily rather than 
asking for direction from the CEO. Within our model this suggests that firms in highly trusted 
regions will obtain greater benefits from a global fall in IT costs since high trust increases the value 
of decentralization. This can be seen by differentiating equation (7) with respect to 𝗼 (noting that 
more IT reduces 𝗼): 
                                                 
9 Note that the surplus will be equal to CEO pay in our model. Although this goes beyond the scope of the current paper 
it is consistent with Gabaix and Landier (2008) who find that CEO pay is increased by the ability of a CEO to leverage 
control over a larger number of middle-managers. Our model implies countries with high trust, like the Unites States and 
the United Kingdom, will tend to have larger firms and higher paid CEOs versus countries with low trust, like Southern 
Europe and developing countries. 
10 Better communication technology can also be modeled in terms of a reduction in h. In Bloom et al. (2010) we consider 
the distinct impact of these.   10 
Proposition 3: Higher trust increases the marginal value of information technology 













where the negative sign results from equation (5), 
𝜕𝑧𝑀
𝜕𝗼 < 0. 
 
We will proxy the surplus in the firm by examining productivity. The way we will empirically 
investigate proposition (3) is to examine whether the marginal effect of IT on productivity is greater 
in high trust environments (which should also be more decentralized according to proposition 1). 
The intuition is that the globally falling price of IT will benefit regions and countries which have 
high trust (and are therefore more decentralized) to a greater degree than low trust regions. This 
identification assumption is that there are adjustment costs to organizational change, so that firms do 
not immediately switch their organizational form after a technology shock. 
 
We will take all three propositions to the data and find empirical support for them. Propositions 1 
and 2 are long-run equilibrium relationships that we examine in the cross section: all else equal 
exogenously high trust areas will have decentralized and larger firms. Trust is very persistent so we 
will use long-run cultural and historical instruments for bilateral trust in cross sections of firms and 
regions. Proposition 3 is more a time series relationship: we examine this relationship using panel 
data to test whether increases in firm IT increase productivity by more in high trust areas than in 
low trust areas. 
 
II.B Other models of trust and decentralization 
The model of the previous section focuses on decentralization in a cognitive model of the hierarchy 
of the firm. Many papers have also focused on our extension to incentive problems such as Aghion 
and Tirole (1997), Prendergast (2002) and Hart and Moore (2005). For example, Acemoglu et al. 
(2007) consider the delegation decision in an incentive based model where a firm faces a choice over 
how to use a new technology with uncertain and heterogeneous returns. The CHQ has a greater 
interest in maximizing the firm’s value than the manager, but the manager has greater local private 
knowledge than the CHQ. This trade-off determines the optimal degree of decentralization. Thus, 
characteristics of the environment that increases the congruence of incentives between the CHQ and 
plant manager, will increase decentralization. If trust reflects a greater congruence of preferences 
between the parties, this should lead to great delegation. 
   11 
Even if decentralization was the efficient choice due to the characteristics of the firm’s environment, 
Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1999) emphasize that delegation is generally informal because the 
CHQ  must usually sign-off on decisions. The issue is whether the CHQ credibly commits to 
allowing the plant manager to effectively make the important decisions and does not override the 
plant manager  (in order to establish her  reputation not to interfere).  Thus, the level of 
decentralization is the outcome of a repeated game between the CHQ and manager.
11
 
 The agent and 
principal’s preferences and beliefs in these models will of course influence the level of delegation. 
Trust is emphasized in the social capital and experimental game theory literatures as one factor that 
leads to co-operation (Putnam, 1993, Fukuyama, 1995, and  Glaeser  et al., 2000). If there are 
heterogeneous types in the population with some ex ante being more likely to co-operate than others, 
then the co-operative outcome (decentralization) is more likely with higher trust. 
In principle, an alternative to trust in sustaining co-operation is Rule of Law. When the employer (or 
employee) can successfully sue for breach of contract this will make contracts easier to enforce and 
sustainable delegation more likely. This will be particularly important in larger firms (Greif 1993). 
In the analysis where we do not control for country dummies we will also consider the independent 
influence of Rule of Law alongside trust. 
 
Since there are models other than our extension of Garicano (2000) that would predict a positive 
relationship between trust and decentralization we do not regard our empirical examination the final 
word on the model. However, the fact that we naturally generate three simple predictions in this 
framework, which are supported by the data, suggests it is a useful framework for organizing our 
thinking. 
III. DATA 
To investigate the role of trust on decentralization we first have to construct a robust measure of 
organizational practices overcoming four hurdles: measuring decentralization, collecting accurate 
responses,  ensuring international comparability,  and obtaining interviews with managers. We 
discuss these in turn. We have also posted the full anonymized dataset and do-files to replicate all 
results (http://www.stanford.edu/~nbloom/org.zip). 
 
III.A Measuring Decentralization 
                                                 
11 Other models, like Rajan and Zingales (2001), focus on the intangible capital view of the firm, with ownership being 
structured so that employees cannot easily split off easily to create rival firms.   12 
We asked four questions  on plant manager decentralization.  First, we asked how much capital 
investment a plant manager could undertake without prior authorization from the corporate 
headquarters. This is a continuous variable enumerated in national currency that we convert into 
dollars using PPPs. We also inquired on where decisions were effectively made in three other 
dimensions: (a) hiring a new full-time permanent shop floor employee, (b) the introduction of a new 
product, and (c) sales and marketing decisions. These more qualitative variables were scaled from a 
score of 1, defined as all decisions taken at the corporate headquarters, to a score of 5 defined as 
complete power (“real authority”) of the plant manager. In Appendix Table A1  we detail the 




Since the scaling may vary across all these questions, we converted the scores from the four 
decentralization questions to z-scores by normalizing each one to mean zero and standard deviation 
one. In our main econometric specifications, we take the unweighted average across all four z-scores 
as our primary measure of overall decentralization, but we also experiment with other weighting 
schemes and also present regressions using the individual questions as dependent variables. 
 
One issue is over measurement of decentralization across different types of firms. Figure 1 provides 
four examples to help explain how we did this. Example A shows the classic case, where the firm 
has one CHQ in New York and one production site in Phoenix. The plant manager is defined as the 
most senior manager at the Phoenix site, with our decentralization measure evaluating how much 
autonomy he has from his manager in New York. In Example B we depict a firm with multiple 
plants, in which we would usually survey one plant and assume this represented the degree of 
decentralization for the firm as a whole (section III.F discusses how we test this assumption). In 
Example C we have a firm with the production facilities and CHQ on the same site. In this case if 
the plant manager was the CEO—which occurred in only 4.9% of our interviews—we could not 
define decentralization (so these observations were dropped).
13
                                                 
12 Some of these four questions are similar to others used in the past to measure decentralization. Acemoglu et al. (2007) 
use a similar question on hiring in the British WERS data and Colombo and Delmastro (2004) have a question similar to 
our one on investment for Italian establishments. 
 If the plant manager and CEO were 
different people on the same site we would define decentralization as usual, but we show how our 
results are weaker in these “same-site” observations  (where  trust matters less because direct 
13 These were typically smaller firms (a mean firm employment of 159 for the CEO plant manager firms versus 843 for 
the rest of the sample), with an insignificant correlation between the share of firms dropped in each country and its 




 Finally, in Example D we show a multinational subsidiary, which we treat 
the same as domestic firms, defining decentralization as the autonomy of the plant from the global 
CHQ. We use the multinationals to get closer to the causal effects of trust on decentralization by 
using bilateral trust information as explained in Section V. 
Finally, we collected a large amount of additional data from the survey to use as controls, including 
management practice information following the methodology of Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) and 
human resource information (e.g. the proportion of the workforce with degrees, average hours 
worked, and the gender and age breakdown). We also collected ownership information from the 
managers, which we cross-checked against the  external sample databases  (see section III.E for 
details). From the sampling frame database we also have information for most firms on their basic 
accounting variables like sales and capital. 
 
III.B Collecting Accurate Responses 
In order to achieve unbiased responses to our questions we took a range of steps. First, the survey 
was conducted by telephone without telling the managers they were being scored on organizational 
or management practices. This enabled scoring to be based on the interviewer’s evaluation of the 
firm’s actual practices, rather than their aspirations, the manager’s perceptions or the interviewer’s 
impressions. To run this “blind” scoring we used open questions (i.e. “To hire a full-time permanent 
shop-floor worker what agreement would your plant need from corporate headquarters?”), rather 
than closed questions (i.e. “Can you hire workers without authority from corporate 
headquarters?”[yes/no]). Following the initial question the discussion would continue until the 
interviewer can make an accurate assessment of the firm’s typical practices. For example, if the 
plant manager responded “It is my decision, but I need sign-off from corporate HQ,” the interviewer 
would ask “How often would sign-off typically be given?” with the response “So far it has never 
been refused” scoring a 4 and the response “Typically agreed in about 80% of the case” scoring a 3. 
 
Second, the interviewers did not know anything about the firm’s financial information or 
performance in advance of the interview. This was achieved by selecting medium sized 
                                                 
14  Empirically, while plant managers with CEOs on site typically have less autonomy (something we control for 
empirically) it is not the case they have no autonomy. The CEO will typically be involved in a number of other tasks 
such as finance, strategy, and sales (which could involve other non-production sites), while the plant manager runs the 
daily production process. An example in  a university context would be the  University  Dean and the Head of the 
Economics Department—they are usually both on the same campus site, but the Head of Department still has some 
autonomy.   14 
manufacturing firms and by providing only firm names and contact details to the interviewers (but 
no financial details). Consequently, the survey tool is “double blind”—managers do not know they 
are being scored and interviewers do not know the performance of the firm. These manufacturing 
firms (the median size was 270 employees) are too small to attract much coverage from the business 
media. All interviews were conducted in the manager’s native language. 
 
Third, each interviewer ran 85 interviews on average, allowing us to remove interviewer fixed 
effects from all empirical specifications. This helps to address concerns over inconsistent 
interpretation of categorical responses,  standardizing the scoring system.  Fourth, the survey 
instrument was targeted at plant managers, who are typically senior enough to have an overview of 
organizational practices but not so senior as to be detached from day-to-day operations. 
 
Fifth, we collected a detailed set of information on the interview process itself (number and type of 
prior contacts before obtaining the interviews, duration, local time-of-day, date and day-of-the 
week), on the manager (gender, seniority, nationality, company and job tenure, internal and external 
employment experience, and location), and on the interviewer (we can include individual 
interviewer-fixed effects, time-of-day, and subjective reliability score). These survey metrics are 
used as “noise controls” to help reduce residual variation. 
 
III.C Ensuring International Comparability 
In comparing organizational and management surveys across countries we have to be extremely 
careful to ensure comparability of responses. To maximize comparability we undertook three steps. 
First, every interviewer had the same initial three days of interview training, provided jointly by the 
Centre for Economic Performance  (CEP) at the London School of Economics (LSE)  and our 
partnering international consultancy firm. This training included three role-play calibration 
exercises, where the group would all score a role-played interview and then discuss scoring together 
of each question. This was aimed at ensuring every interviewer had a common interpretation of the 
scoring grid. In addition every Friday afternoon throughout the survey period the group met for 90 
minutes for training and to discuss any problems with interpretation of the survey. 
 
Second, the team operated from one location, the LSE. The different national survey teams were 
thus organized and managed in the same way, ran the surveys using exactly the same telephone,   15 




Third, the individual interviewers interviewed firms in multiple countries. The team language was 
English, so that interviewers were able to interview firms from their own country plus the United 
Kingdom and the United States. As a result the median number of countries that each interviewer 
scored  firms in was three, enabling us to remove interviewer fixed effects in the cross-country 
analysis. 
III.D Obtaining Interviews with Managers 
Each  interview took on average 48  minutes and was run in the summer  of 2006. Overall, we 
obtained a relatively high response rate of 45%, which was achieved through several steps. First, the 
interview was introduced as “a piece of work” without discussion of the firm’s financial position or 
its company accounts. Interviewers did not discuss financials in the interviews, both to maximize the 
participation of firms and to ensure our interviewers were truly “blind” on the firm’s financial 
position. Second, the survey was ordered to lead with the least controversial questions (on shop-floor 
operations management), leading on to monitoring, incentives, and organizational structure. Third, 
interviewers’ performance was monitored, as was the proportion of interviews achieved, so they 
were persistent in chasing firms.
16 Fourth, the written endorsement of many official institutions
17 
helped demonstrate to managers that this was an important academic exercise with official support. 
Fifth, we hired high quality (mainly MBA student) interviewers,
18
 
 mostly with prior manufacturing 
experience, which helped to signal to managers the high quality nature of the interview. 
III.E Sampling Frame and Additional Data 
Since our aim is to compare across countries we decided to focus on the manufacturing sector where 
productivity is easier to measure than in the non-manufacturing sector. We also focused on medium 
sized firms, selecting a sample of firms with between 100 and 5,000 workers (with a median of 270). 
Very small firms have little publicly available data. Very large firms are likely to be more 
heterogeneous across plants. We drew a sampling frame from each country to be representative of 
medium sized manufacturing firms and then randomly chose the order of which firms to contact (see 
                                                 
15 See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HgJXt8KwhA8 for video footage of the survey team. 
16 We found no significant correlation between the number, type, and time-span of contacts before an interview is 
conducted and the management score. 
17  The Banque de France, Bank of Greece, Bank of Japan, Bank of Portugal, Beijing  University,  Bundesbank, 
Confederation of Indian Industry, European Central Bank, European Commission, Greek Employers Federation, IUI 
Sweden, Ministero delle Finanze, National Bank of Poland, Peoples Bank of China, Polish Treasury, Reserve Bank of 
India, Shenzhen Development Bank, Sveriges Riksbank, U.K. Treasury, and Warsaw Stock Exchange. 
18 Interviewers were post-graduate students drawn from the following universities: Berkeley, City of London, Columbia, 
Harvard, HEC, IESE, Imperial, Insead, Kellogg, LBS, LSE, Lund, MIT, Nova de Lisbon, Oxford, Stanford, and Yale.   16 
Appendix B for details). Since we use two different databases (BVD’s Orbis for Europe, the United 
States, China, and Japan; and CMIE’s Firstsource for India) we had concerns regarding the cross-
country comparisons so we include country dummies in most  of  the  specifications. Comparing 
responding firms with those in the sampling frame, we found no evidence that the responders were 
systematically different on the observable measures to the non-responders. The only exception was 
on size and multinational status, where our firms were slightly larger and more likely to be 
multinational than those in the sampling frame (details in Data Appendix). 
 
III.F Evaluating and Controlling for Measurement Error 
The data potentially suffers from several types of measurement error. To quantify this we performed 
repeat interviews on 72 firms, contacting different managers in different plants at the same firm, 
using different interviewers. To the extent that our organizational measure is truly picking up 
company-wide practices these two scores should be correlated, while to the extent the measure is 
driven by noise the measures should be independent. The correlation of the first interview against 
the second interviews was 0.513 (p-value of 0.000). Furthermore, there is no obvious (or statistically 
significant) relationship between the degree of measurement error and the decentralization score. 
That is to say, firms that reported very low or high decentralization scores appeared to be genuinely 
very centralized or decentralized, rather than extreme draws of sampling measurement error. 
 
III.G Measuring trust 
We build trust measures using the World Values Survey (WVS), a collection of surveys 
administered to representative samples of individuals in 66 countries between 1981 and 2004. These 
questionnaires contain information on several social, religious, and political attitudes. The World 
Values Survey aims at measuring generalized trust, namely the expectation of the respondent 
regarding the trustworthiness of other individuals. The wording of this question is “Generally 
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing 
with people?” The trust variable that we use in the regressions is the percentage of people choosing 
the first option in the trust question within the geography where central headquarters of the plant 
(CHQ) are located. We thought this is most appropriate, because the decision to decentralize is made 
at the CHQ level, but we also check for the independent importance of trust in the plant’s location 
for firms where the CHQ is located in a different region or country from the plant. 
 
This is the most common measure of trust used in the literature, and appears to be correlated with 
trusting behavior. Fehr et al. (2003) ran a series of experiments suggesting that the WVS question   17 
does indeed measure trust. Glaeser et al. (2000), by contrast, ran experiments on undergraduates and 
argued that the WVS trust question better measures the trustworthiness of subjects. Sapienza et al. 
(2007) reconcile these findings: they provide evidence that the WVS question is driven by what they 
call the “belief based component of trust.” In other words, when you are not extrapolating the 
trustworthiness of others based on your own trustworthiness (as Fehr et al., 2003), the large sample 
WVS really does measure trust rather than trustworthiness. In our context we want to measure trust 
of the headquarters (towards the plant manager), so the WVS question seems appropriate for the 
task. 
 
Figure 2 plots the trust by country and its regional dispersion. In order to exploit this within country 
variation for identification, we identify the specific region where the corporate headquarters of each 
of the plants included in our survey are located, and compute the average level of trust in this area 
using  the WVS. The precise level of aggregation of the trust  measure varies according to 
geographical detail included in our own decentralization survey and in the WVS. Through our 
survey data, we are able to allocate plants belonging to purely domestic firms and domestic 
multinationals (2,744 observations in total, or about two thirds of our entire sample) to narrowly 
defined  regions  within countries (e.g.  NUTS3 levels in Europe  or  individual states  in India).
19 
However, since the level of geographical detail provided by the WVS varies within countries, we are 
sometimes forced to work at a higher level of aggregation.
20
 
 In the case of the 881 plants that belong 
to foreign multinationals, we match the plant with information on the level of trust in the country 
where the global ultimate owner of the plant is headquartered, which was also collected in the 
decentralization survey. 
IV. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
IV. A Decentralization 
Our preferred measure of decentralization is an average across four z-scored measures of plant 
manager autonomy on hiring, capital expenditure, marketing, and product innovations. The resulting 
variable is what we define as decentralization (or autonomy of the plant manager). The cross country 
averages of decentralization are  shown in Figure 3,  revealing  some interesting patterns. Firms 
located in Asia (China, Japan, and India) tend to be much more centralized than firms located in 
                                                 
19 In the vast majority of cases—93% of the plants belonging to purely domestic firms or domestic multinationals—the 
plant is actually located within the same region of the headquarters. 
20 For example, in the United States and China the WVS only provides broader geographical markers, which correspond 
to group of states. See Appendix B for details.   18 
Anglo-Saxon (Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States) and Scandinavian (Sweden) 
countries. The rest of Europe tends to be in the middle of the decentralization ranking—with the 
exception of firms located in Greece, which appear to be very centralized. The differences between 
the three groups of countries are statistically significant at the 1% level, even when we include a full 
set of firm characteristics and survey noise controls. Table A2 in Appendix provides more details 
behind these cross-country comparisons and reveals that, while Sweden, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States are at the top of the decentralization distribution across all four dimensions, for the 
rest of the countries the ranking varies. For example, Germany tends to be closer to the other 
Continental European countries included in our sample (i.e. less decentralized) with regards to the 
hiring and firing autonomy of the plant manager. On the other hand, plant managers working in 
Japan have limited autonomy because hiring is very centralized due to lifetime tenure. Japanese 
firms do provide more autonomy over capital expenditures and Japanese workers also have high 
levels of autonomy. 
 
Figure 4 shows the distribution of the decentralization variable across firms by country. It is clear 
that there is a huge amount of heterogeneity, even within countries. About 15% of the overall 
variance in our decentralization measure is across countries, 8% is across three digit industry class, 
and 81% of the variation is orthogonal to both country and three digit industry. 
 
IV.B External Validation 
A possible concern is that the cross country differences in decentralization emerging from our study 
may reflect the specific characteristics of the firms that participated in the survey (i.e. medium sized 
manufacturing firms), rather than more general organizational features. Therefore, to validate our 
decentralization measure, we compared it to two other cross-country decentralization indices that 
exist in the literature. 
 
The first is the Power Distance rankings created by Hofstede (1980). The Power Distance Index 
(PDI) is a measure of interpersonal power or influence between a boss and their subordinate, built 
out of successive attitudinal surveys conducted on more than 70,000 IBM employees across 
approximately 50 countries in the 1970s and 1980s. While our decentralization variable provides a 
factual description of the average autonomy allocated to the plant-managers, the PDI measures the 
perceptions  of and the preferences  for hierarchical relationships  among non-managerial IBM 
employees. The PDI measure is based on aggregating questions relating to: (i) non-managerial 
employees’ perception that employees are afraid to disagree with their managers; (ii) subordinates’   19 
perception that their boss tends to make decisions in an autocratic or paternalistic way; and (iii) 
subordinates’ preference for anything but a consultative style of decision making. High PDI values 
reflect perceptions of and preferences for self-determination. Figure 5 shows that the country level 
averages of the PDI and our decentralization measure are extremely similar (correlation 0.80, 
significant at the 1% level). This is reassuring since it suggests that across countries our 
decentralization variable captures long-lived organizational traits across countries, rather than 
specific characteristics of our firm sample.  
 
The second cross-country decentralization indices are those  created by Arzaghi and Henderson 
(2005) to evaluate fiscal decentralization across countries. They generated an index on a 0 to 4 scale 
that averaged over scores for decentralization of Government structure (unitary versus federal) and 
the degree of autonomy and democratization of state, province, and municipal governments over 
taxation, education, infrastructure, and policing. A value of 0 denotes the country is fully centralized 
across every dimension, while a value of 4 denotes a highly decentralized fiscal structure. This 
measure was calculated for every country with 10 million or more employees in 1995, which 
includes ten of our twelve countries. Figure 6 shows this fiscal decentralization index is also 
extremely close to our decentralization index (correlation of 0.827, significant at the 1% level). 
Thus, countries in our sample with decentralized firms also tend to have decentralized governments 
suggesting this is a more general phenomenon. 
 
V. TRUST AND FIRM ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
 
V.A Trust and Decentralization 
Our theory predicts that greater trust of the CEO in the plant manager should lead to increased 
managerial delegation (Proposition 1). Column (1) of Table 1 presents the results of regressing our 
decentralization measure against average trust in the area where the plant’s headquarters are located, 
with no other controls. The relationship between decentralization and trust is positive and highly 
significant—a one-standard deviation in trust (12 percentage points) is associated with a 15% of a 
standard deviation increase in decentralization. A concern is that high levels of trust could simply 
proxy for better law enforcement or higher levels of economic development. Column (2) includes an   20 
indicator for country-wide “Rule of Law,”
  21 GDP per capita, and population. Rule of Law enters 
with a positive and significant coefficient,
22
 
 but trust also plays an independent role. 
Trust may be associated with decentralization because it sustains larger equilibrium organizational 
size or because skill levels are higher (in Section II). Consistent with this, column (3) shows that 




Conditioning on size and skills halves the trust coefficient compared to column (1), but it remains 
significant. In terms of our other covariates, foreign multinationals are more decentralized relative to 
both home country multinationals and purely domestic firms. This could  reflect  the  greater 
complexity of managing across national boundaries and larger global size. 
In column (4) of Table 1 we include a full set of country dummies to address the concern that there 
might still be many omitted unobserved country-level factors like regulation (Aghion et al., 2010) 
generating a spurious positive correlation between trust and decentralization. We also include three-
digit industry dummies, measures of local development (GDP per capita and population  at the 
regional level), and “noise controls” (for measurement error in the decentralization variable) such as 
interviewer fixed effects. The coefficient on trust remains significant and is similar in magnitude to 
the simpler specifications in the first three columns. 
 
An implication of our model is that trust should matter more when the CEO is located on a different 
site from the plant as communication costs will be higher and monitoring is more difficult and so 
centralization becomes more costly. Column (5) estimates the regressions on the sub-sample where 
the CEO is offsite (such as Example B in Figure 1)) and column (6) on the sub-sample where the 
CEO is on-site (i.e. the headquarter building is located at the same site as the factory manager we 
interviewed, such as Example C in Figure 1). Although the coefficient on trust is positive in both 
cases, it is much larger and only significant when the CEO is further away from the plant manager as 
                                                 
21 This indicator was developed by the World Bank and measures “the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as 
the likelihood of crime and violence” (Kaufmann et al., 2006). 
22 GDP per capita and population are insignificant at conventional levels. The coefficient (standard error) on ln(GDP per 
capita) is -0.082 (0.061), and for ln(population) is 0.042 (0.028). 
23 The results are unchanged when we include measures of regional skills, which is positive but insignificant.   21 
we would expect. When the CEO is onsite presumably monitoring is easier so that trust becomes 




The magnitude of the association between decentralization and trust is large.  As noted above, 
column (1) implies a one-standard deviation in trust and is associated with a 15% standard deviation 
increase in decentralization. Including the full set of covariates in column (4) halves this to 7%. 
These numbers are similar when we run the regression at the level of the headquarter region/country 
of location, with the regional equivalent for column (1) implying that a one standard deviation in 
trust increases decentralization by 13% of a standard deviation. Figure 7 plots this result by plotting 
actual levels of decentralization against those predicted by average trust in the headquarter location. 
The size of these differences are substantial, for example, moving from the lowest trust region 
(Assam in India) to the highest trust region (Norrland in Sweden) would be associated with an 
increase of the decentralization index of 0.38 of a standard deviation.
25
 
 Finally, running instrumental 
variable regressions, as we do in section V.B below, leads to even larger magnitudes. 
V.B Exploiting differences in the location of the plant and its headquarters 
About a third of our  sample  (1,094 observations) has  headquarters  located  in a different 
geographical area (region or country)  from  the plant itself, including 881 affiliates  of foreign 
multinationals. This sub-sample is interesting for two reasons. First, we can include fixed effects for 
the regional location of the plant  removing any bias associated with other  geographical 
characteristics spuriously correlated with local trust and decentralization.
26 Secondly, by focusing on 
the sample of foreign multinationals we can study whether country of origin characteristics—such as 
trust—have an effect on the multinational’s  structure. This has long been a pre-occupation of 
business case studies, and the more recent trade literature on the organization of multinationals.
27
                                                 
24 This difference is not simply a reflection of size. When we split the sample into firms above and below 250 employees 
the trust coefficient was significant in both sub-samples and only slightly larger in the smaller firms (0.940 vs. 0.824). 
See Appendix Table B2. 
 In 
particular, for 422  of these foreign affiliates we have information on  bilateral  trust  between 
countries, derived from a series of surveys conducted for the European Commission. These surveys 
asked around 1,000 individuals in each country the following question “I would like to ask you a 
question about how much trust you have in people from various countries. For each, please tell me 
25 Using the 0.608 coefficient in Table 1, column (4) and the trust values in Assam and Norrland of 0.13 and 0.76 
respectively. 
26 This also includes any potential language or national bias in the interview process, since multinationals are always 
interviewed in the local language, with the question on the ownership of the firm only asked at the end of the interview. 
27 See, for example, Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004), Antras, Garicano, and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) or Burstein and 
Monge-Naranjo 2009.   22 
whether you have a lot of trust, some trust, not very much trust, or no trust at all.” This question was 
asked about all other E.U. countries and a number of non-E.U. countries like the United States, 
Japan, and Canada. For our purposes, the bilateral trust variable is ideal because it allows us to 
analyze the role of trust for decentralization controlling for a full set of region of location and 
country of origin dummies. 
 
The results of this analysis are shown in Table 2. These regressions are based on the specification of 




(1) simply shows that the coefficient on trust remains positive and significant (0.625 with a standard 
error of 0.274) in this sub-sample where region of plant and CHQ are different. In column (2) we 
repeat the specification adding fixed effects for the plant’s region of location. Both the magnitude 
and the significance level of the trust variable remain similar with the inclusion of the regional 
dummies.  From column (3) onwards, we focus exclusively on the sub-sample of subsidiaries of 
foreign multinationals. Columns (3) and (4) show that the association between decentralization and 
trust in the country of origin is still positive and significant in the subsample of 881 subsidiaries of 
foreign multinationals, and the even smaller sample of 422 foreign multinationals with data on 
bilateral trust. In column (5) we look at the relationship between trust and decentralization using the 
bilateral trust measure for our foreign multinational sample. We find that multinational subsidiaries 
located in a country that their parent country tends to trust (like a French subsidiary in Belgium) are 
typically more decentralized than subsidiaries located in a country that the multinational’s parent 
country does not trust (like a French subsidiary in Britain). This bilateral trust variable drives the 
coefficient on general HQ level trust to zero. In column (6) we include both a full set of country 
location and origin dummies, so that we are only identifying the trust effect of the pairwise variation 
in trust. Even in this demanding specification higher bilateral trust is associated with significantly 
more decentralization. 
One concern is that there could still be an endogeneity bias affecting the coefficient on trust. For 
example,  greater decentralization in multinationals might engender  home country trust,  or  there 
might be an omitted bilateral variable increasing trust and decentralization. To investigate the causal 
                                                 
28 The only difference is that we use two-digit rather than three-digit industry dummies because of the smaller sample 
size. In the subsample of 422 subsidiaries of foreign multinationals that we analyze in Table 2 columns (4) to (7), for 
example, there are 83 distinct three-digit industries, but 20% of them are populated only by a single firm (the median 
number of observation per three digit industry is 3). When we move to a specification with two-digit dummies, we can 
identify only 18 distinct industries, but of these, only one is populated by a single firm  (the median number of 
observations per two-digit industry is 21).   23 
effect of trust on decentralization, in column (7) we instrument bilateral trust using the approach of 
Guiso  et  al.  (2009). They develop a set of instruments for trust based on religious and ethnic 
similarities between pairs of countries.
29
 
 These are likely to be long-standing differences determined 
many centuries ago and exogenous to other characteristics, and are significant in explaining 
variations in bilateral trust (F-test p-value of 18.2). These instruments also pass the Hansen over-
identification test of the exclusion restrictions (p-value 0.853). However, despite this there could still 
be some concern that religious and ethnic differences may proxy for broader measures of cultural 
interaction between countries beyond trust as Guiso et al (2009) discuss. To investigate this we also 
run a battery of tests in Tables B2 to B4, including in Table B4 gravity measures like geographical 
distance, colonial links, a common legal origin and a common language, and find the results to be 
robust. 
When trust is instrumented with these religious and somatic distance measures the point-estimates 
for the impact of trust on decentralization are, if anything, larger than with OLS,
30 This result is 
suggestive of a causal effect of trust on decentralization in firms and also provides one potential 
mechanism for the Guiso et al. (2009) FDI results. Multinational firms have a greater need to 
decentralize to foreign subsidiaries due to the local managers’ better private information, but will be 
reluctant to do so when they do not trust the local management. Being able to decentralize will 
increase the attractiveness of these locations for FDI as in Guiso et al. (2009). These results also 
suggest  a cross-country selection mechanism for industrial location. Industries requiring greater 
levels of decentralization should operate in higher-trust countries. In Appendix Table B1 we show 
these patterns of comparative advantage in action. High trust areas tend to attract industries that are 
likely to be decentralized (as measured by the degree of decentralization in the United Kingdom or 
the United States).
31
   
 
                                                 
29 Religious differences are calculated as the product of the fraction of individuals in each country in each religion, and 
genetic distances as the somatic gap between countries in terms of differences in hair color, facial shape, and height (see 
Appendix for details). The idea is that countries with different religions and different visual appearances are less likely to 
bilaterally trust each other. Guiso et al. (2009) show these two measures are an important predictor of bilateral trust, and 
are robust to controls for similarities in law, language, and informational overlap. 
30 The results are qualitatively similar when we enter the instruments individually, although the bilateral trust variable in 
the IV specification of Table 2, column (7) is significant at only the 10% level when we use the somatic distance 
variable alone as an instrument. The religious distance alone yields a coefficient that is significant at the 5% level. 
31  These decentralized industries have higher levels of R&D, investment,  and education per employee. This may 
generate a wider distribution of problems as production is more complex, so that greater decentralization is optimal.   24 
V.C Robustness and extensions 
We have extensively tested the robustness of the decentralization and trust relationship. We report 
the main ones in Table 3. Column (1) re-presents the baseline specification of column (4) in Table 1. 
We were concerned that the relationship could represent unobserved management quality, so we 
used the management practices measure from the CEP survey as detailed in Bloom and Van Reenen 
(2007, 2010) in column (2). Firms with better management practices appeared to be significantly 
more decentralized, but the coefficient on trust was essentially unaltered. Could the effect of trust be 
proxying for some other mechanism such as incentive pay? Firms adopting high powered incentives 
(as measured by the percentage of salary linked to individual performance) also appeared to be more 
decentralized (in line with Prendergast 2002), but this does not affect the coefficient on trust 
(column (3)). Some authors have stressed the prevalence of family firms (who are usually more 
centralized) as a result of low trust levels (e.g. Mueller and Philippon, 2011). We found no 
significant evidence that family management affects decentralization once the trust variable is 
included (column (4)), however. Column (5) includes the prevalence of “hierarchical religions,” 
defined following La Porta et al. (1997) as the percentage of the population belonging to the 
Catholic, Islamic, or Eastern Orthodox faiths, with the idea that hierarchical religion reduces (or 
reflects) the lower taste for autonomy in the local population and so reduces the probability of 
decentralization. Hierarchical religion does seem negatively associated with decentralization.
32 
Column (6) includes a measure capturing the intensity of product market competition (the number of 




 Finally, in column (7) we include all the extra variables simultaneously. In all 
these experiments, trust remains positive and significant with only small changes to its coefficient. 
We report a more extensive range of robustness checks in Appendix B (see Tables B2–B4). These 
analyze measurement error in the trust variable and alternative functional forms for decentralization. 
For example, we show that the trust measure is robust to constructing it from the largest wave of the 
survey, the latest wave, and dropping the ESS survey completely (see columns (6)–(8) in Table B2). 
We also include a host of other potentially confounding variables such as indicators for civic 
responsibility, personal autonomy, and gravity type variables. The results are very robust to all these 
experiments. 
                                                 
32 Hierarchical religion could also reduce trust, which would further depress decentralization. Interestingly, it is religion 
in the plant’s region of location which matters rather than in the CHQ: when CHQ religion is used in column (5) it is 
insignificant. This suggests what matters is plant managers (and perhaps worker) tastes, rather than CHQ preferences. 
33 For example, Guadalupe and Wulf (2010), Alonso, Dessein, and Matouschek (2008) and Bloom et al. (2010).   25 
 
V.D Trust and firm size 
Proposition 2 of our model is that trust should also increase average firm size, since a CEO could 
manage more plants through increased decentralization. To investigate this we use the population of 
all public and private firms from our accounting databases (see Data Appendix) to measure average 
firm size in manufacturing (i.e. we do not use the data from our organizational survey). We focus on 
the firm size distribution for those with at least 100 employees because this is the group that we 
targeted in our organizational survey. These firms are likely to require some kind of formal 
management structure; in smaller firms—say a 10 person factory—the CEO can directly manage all 




In column (1) of Table 4 we show that firms in a given region are much larger when trust is higher 
and Rule of Law is stronger. This is consistent with the earlier cross-country trust results in La Porta 
et al. (1997) and Kummar et al. (2005), and cross-region Rule of Law results in Mexico in Laeven 
and Woodruff (2007). In column (2) we go beyond the prior literature by including a full set of 
country dummies and exploiting within country variations in trust. The coefficient on trust remains 
positive and significant. In columns (3), (4), and (5) we re-estimate our specification from column 
(2), but for a greater range of the total firm size distribution. The coefficient on trust falls to some 
extent as we include more of the size distribution,  which is what we would expect if trust 
particularly mattered for large firms (from 1.921 for 100+ employee firms in column (2) to 1.668 for 
all firms in column (4)). Nevertheless, trust remains significant throughout all columns. 
 
The magnitude of the trust coefficient in column (2) is large—a one standard deviation increase in 
trust (12 percentage points) would be associated with 23% of a standard deviation of firm size. In 
terms of regions moving from the lowest trust region (Assam in India) to the highest trust region 
(Norrland in Sweden)—would be associated with a 117 log point increase in firm size. Given the 
importance of large firms for reallocation and aggregate productivity growth, this highlights a 
                                                 
34 We also had concerns about the representativeness of the accounting databases for smaller firms in some countries In 
some countries like India smaller firms are often unregistered. But for manufacturing firms with over 100 employees this 
is much less likely, given these firms typically operate with a large production facility, which will be hard to keep hidden 
from the authorities. Given our focus is on the size of firms rather than the size of plants using firm level databases 
(rather than Census databases on plants) is appropriate.   26 
potentially important role for social capital and culture in explaining aggregate productivity (e.g. 




VI. FIRM-LEVEL PRODUCTIVITY AND DECENTRALIZATION 
A key question in analyzing firm organizational structures is the impact this could have on firm and 
national productivity. We have suggested that one route through which social capital matters is by 
allowing output to be efficiently reallocated to larger firms (sub-section V.C). In this section we 
examine our survey micro data to examine a second route—the within firm association of 
decentralization with productivity. 
 
Consider the basic firm production function:
36
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where D = decentralization, Y = sales (deflated by a three digit industry deflator), L = labor, K = 
non-IT capital and C = IT capital of firm i at time t, and lower case letters denote natural logarithms, 
e.g. y = ln(Y). Note under constant returns  =0. The Z’s are controls such as skills, firm age, 
industry and country dummies.  
 
In column (1) of Table 5  we run a basic specification with only capital  intensity  and 
decentralization, and find a positive and significant coefficient on decentralization. The coefficient 
suggests a one standard deviation increase in decentralization is associated with an 11% increase in 
productivity. In column (2) we include the full set of control variables, including education, country, 
and industry dummies. The coefficient on decentralization falls to 0.009 and is no longer statistically 
significant. Note that the coefficient on capital is close to its share in revenues (0.355) and the 
coefficient on ln(employment) is -0.013 with a standard error of 0.014 implying that we cannot 
reject constant returns (employment is included in all columns). 
 
Although  decentralization may only have a small direct association with productivity, it may 
complement other individual factors of production. To investigate this we augment our estimating 
equation to include interactions with all factor inputs: 
                                                 
35 This is consistent with recent field experiments on Indian firms showing improvements in management led to more 
decentralized decision making, which facilitated growth by allowing firm owners to manage more plants given their 
fixed supply of time (Bloom et al., 2011). 
36 There is an extensive literature on the interpretation of the coefficients in these equations. In particular, in the absence 
of firm-specific prices the coefficients on the factor inputs should be interpreted as a mix of “true” productivity 
parameters and a mark-up term (e.g. Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson, 2008). 
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The test of proposition 3 is whether the interaction between decentralization and IT is positive, i.e. 
>0. This would be consistent with a growing prior literature suggesting that decentralized firms 




In column (3) we focus on the sample of firms where we have IT data from the Harte Hanks dataset. 
The coefficients on capital and skills are similar to the larger sample. IT is significantly and 
positively associated with productivity, but more interestingly, the coefficient on the IT 
*decentralization interaction is positive and significant. This is consistent with the idea that IT is 
more effectively used in decentralized firms. In column (4) we re-run this estimation including a full 
set of firm-level fixed effects to control for any other unobserved cross-sectional factors, and again 
find a positive and significant coefficient on the interaction term between IT and decentralization 
(note that the linear time invariant variables like decentralization are absorbed by the firm fixed 
effects). In column (5) we include the additional interactions of decentralization with capital (which 
is negative and significant) and employment (which is insignificant). The main interaction of IT and 
decentralization is robust to this extended model.
38  We also experimented with including an 
extensive range of additional nonlinearities (to allow for a translog production function) without any 




The magnitude of the coefficient on the IT and decentralization interaction at 0.052 is quantitatively 
important. For example, the real IT capital stock has been growing by about 8% a year faster than 
non-IT capital inputs in Europe and the United States,
40
 
  so that a firm (or country) with one 
standard-deviation higher decentralization would have about 0.46 percentage points faster annual 
productivity growth. 
                                                 
37 See, for example, Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002), Bartel, Ichinowski, and Shaw (2007) and Garicano and 
Heaton (2010). 
38 We also experimented with adding an interaction between skills and IT which yielded a positive but insignificant 
coefficient (0.010 with standard error of 0.027) and the interaction with decentralization and IT remained significant 
(0.068 with a standard error of 0.017). 
39 For example, we estimated a specification including squared terms in labor, capital intensity, IT intensity, interactions 
between capital and labor, and IT and labor and obtained a coefficient (standard error) on the decentralization*IT 
interaction of 0.060 (0.016). 
40 Calculated from 1994 to 2004 using the Groningen Growth and Development Centre dataset for Europe and the 
United States. 
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Columns (6) and (7) of Table 5 estimate the specification of column (5) solely on multinational 
affiliates. This is the same sub-sample we use in Table 2 columns (4)–(7) except we also drop 
observations with missing IT data. Although the sub-sample is much smaller we find reasonably 
similar coefficient estimates to the larger sample; in particular, there is a still a significant and 
positive interaction between IT and decentralization. 
 
A major problem with interpreting these estimates is endogeneity of decentralization and the factor 
inputs. To tackle this we first estimated TFP using a version of the Olley-Pakes (1996) method 
separately for each two-digit sector.
41
 
 To deal with the endogeneity of trust, our key underlying 
determinant of decentralization, we exploit the religious and somatic closeness instruments between 
countries used in Table 2. In column (7) of Table 5 we use TFP as the dependent variable and 
include bilateral trust interacted with IT as our key right hand side variable (using the interactions of 
IT with somatic and religious distance as instruments). This directly tests proposition 3 from section 
II, that trust increases the productivity impact of IT. Despite the rigor of this specification, the 
coefficient on the interaction between trust and IT is positive and significant at the 10% level. 
In  summary,  Table 5  provides some support for the third prediction of our theory. Trust  (and 
decentralization) matters for productivity when firms are adopting IT at a rapid rate. 
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
We have argued that social capital as proxied by trust enhances aggregate productivity through 
affecting the internal organization of firms. More trusted regions are able to sustain  more 
decentralized and larger firms which aids productivity both through reallocation and through better 
use of new technologies. Trust is even important when we look at subsidiaries of multinational 
firms—delegation is much more likely for pairs of countries with high bilateral trust. This is 
consistent with a model of trust under delegation we develop, which predicts that higher trust leads 
to increased  decentralization,  larger firm size,  and a higher marginal impact of information 
technologies on firm performance. 
 
A second contribution of our paper is to start to provide data infrastructure for the analysis of firm 
organization  across countries.  Despite many theoretical advances,  the empirical literature on 
                                                 
41 We used a third order series expansion for the control function for both the first and second stage of the Olley-Pakes 
routine.   29 
organizational economics lacks comparable measures of firms’ internal organization. By collecting 
original data on decentralization across many thousands of firms in twelve countries we start to 
address this lacuna. 
 
Since the importance of decentralization appears to be growing over time (e.g. Rajan and Wulf, 
2006) countries with a comparative advantage in decentralization such as the United States and 
Northern Europe are likely to benefit disproportionately. If the trend towards rapid technical change 
and greater competition in markets continues this is likely to give large  productivity  growth 
advantages to such countries. Our estimates suggest that regions with a one standard deviation 
higher level of decentralization would have enjoyed about one half a percent higher growth since the 
mid-1990s. 
 
There are many future directions for this work. One is running field experiments on organizational 
changes within large firms to obtain further micro organizational evidence. Another is to further 
investigate the role of changes in information and technology. We have used a composite hardware 
measure as is standard in the literature but Garicano (2000) and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg 
(2007) have stressed that the impact of falls in information costs on delegation are often the opposite 
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We typically observe just one plant per firm & assume this is representative,
but sometimes we sample more than 1 plant
Example C:
US Domestic Firm






Some firms have a site with multiple “buildings”, such as a CHQ and production 
plants. We only keep these if the plant manager is not the CEO, as decentralization 
is still possible even if the CEO is on-site (think of Universities, which typically have 
one-site but Departmental Heads have some autonomy from the Dean). We also 















Do observe D Do observe D
We have affiliates of multinationals
if they are under 5000 workers. We
Measure D between the domestic
CHQ and the plant manager.
FIGURE 1 – EXAMPLES OF FIRM ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES 
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FIGURE 2 – TRUST BY COUNTRY AND REGIONAL DISPERSION  
 
Notes: The graph shows median level of trust. The vertical bars denote minimum and maximum levels.  
 
FIGURE 3 - AVERAGE DECENTRALIZATION BY COUNTRY 
 
Notes: The graph plots the average z-scored decentralization index by country, measured as the plant manager’s degree 
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FIGURE 4 – DISTRIBUTION OF THE DECENTRALIZATION VARIABLE BY COUNTRY 
 
Notes: These are the distributions of the decentralization index, which measures the degree of autonomy of plant managers 
over hiring, investment, products, and prices. N=3549. Higher scores indicate more decentralization. 
  
FIGURE 5 - DECENTRALIZATION AND POWER DISTANCE INDEX BY COUNTRY 
 
Notes: The y-axis is the average level of autonomy of plant managers over hiring, investment, products, and pricing by 
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FIGURE 6 – FIRM AND POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION BY COUNTRY 
 
Notes: The y-axis is the average level of autonomy of plant managers over hiring, investment, products, and pricing by 
country. The x-axis is Arzaghi and Henderson’s (2005) Fiscal Decentralization Index. 
 
FIGURE 7 – QUANTIFICATION, BY REGION 
 
Notes: The y-axis is average regional decentralization z-score, measured as the average scores for firms within the region 
on  their plant manager’s degree of autonomy over hiring, investment, products,  and pricing. The x-axis is regional 
decentralization z-score predicted from our measures of regional trust  and  country  rule of law.  The graph excludes 
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TABLE 1 - DECENTRALIZATION AND TRUST 














Trust   1.231***  0.916***  0.665**  0.608***  0.973**  0.317 
Trust measured in CHQ region/country of location  (0.440)  (0.327)  (0.239)  (0.220)  (0.388)  (0.330) 
Rule of Law (country of plant location)    0.580***  0.437***       
(-2.5=low, 2.5=high)    (0.071)  (0.113       
Plant Skills      0.106***  0.124***  0.164***  0.092*** 
% Plant employees with a College degree      (0.033)  (0.030)  (0.039)  (0.030) 
Firm Size      0.093***  0.048*  0.051  0.028 
ln(Firm employment)      (0.021)  (0.025)  (0.036)  (0.039) 
Plant employment      0.133***  0.097***  0.121***  0.058** 
Plant employees as a % of firm      (0.027)  (0.025)  (0.043)  (0.029) 
Foreign Multinational      0.168***  0.160  0.763  -0.104 
Dummy=1 if firm belongs  to a foreign multinational      (0.064)  (0.326)  (0.697)  (0.465) 
Domestic Multinational      0.027  -0.003  0.030  0.050 
Dummy=1 if firm belongs  to a domestic multinational      (0.050)  (0.047)  (0.095)  (0.060) 
Observations  3655  3655  3655  3655  1375  2280 
Country of CHQ location controls (2)  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country of plant location dummies (11)  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region of plant location controls (2)  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry dummies (148)  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Other controls (56)  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Clustering 
CHQ location  CHQ location  CHQ location  CHQ location  CHQ location  CHQ location 
Notes: * significant at 10%; **  5%; *** at 1%. Dependent variable is the decentralization z-score index, measured by plant manager’s autonomy over hiring, investment, 
products, and pricing. Estimation by OLS with robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by the firm’s headquarter region of location (country of origin 
if the plant belongs to a foreign multinational). TRUST measures the percentage of individuals who agreed with the statement “most people can be trusted” in the firm’s 
headquarter region of location (country of origin if the plant belongs to a foreign multinational). RULE OF LAW measures extent of confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society (Kauffman et al., 2007), and ranges between -2.5 and 2.5. “Country of CHQ location controls” are the log of GDP per capita and population in the country of CHQ 
location. “Region of plant location” controls are the log of GDP per capita and population in the region where the plant is located. “Industry dummies” are 3 digit SIC 
dummies. “Other controls” include a dummy for whether the firm is publicly listed, a dummy for whether the CEO is on the same site as the plant (“CEO onsite”), and “Noise 
controls” (these include 44 interviewer dummies, 6 dummies to control for the day of the week the interview took place, an interview reliability score, the manager’s seniority 
and tenure, and the duration of the interview. Regressions weighted by the share of World Values Survey respondents in the region in the country, as survey sample sizes (and 
thus survey measure error) varied by region. This weight is set to one if the plant belongs to a foreign multinational since we have no region for the multinationals parent.   38 
TABLE 2 - DECENTRALIZATION AND TRUST; EXPLOITING DIFFERENCES IN CORPORATE HEADQUARTERS (CHQ) LOCATION 


























(bilateral trust data 
available) 
Estimation method  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  IV 
Trust  0.625**  0.601**  0.622*  0.619**  -0.195     
Trust measured in CHQ region/country of 
location  (0.274)  (0.285)  (0.311)  (0.288)  (0.467)     
Bilateral trust          1.744***  1.662**  2.385** 
Trust of people from country of origin for 
people in country of location          (0.617)  (0.804)  (1.106) 
Observations  1094  1094  881  422  422  422  422 
Country of CHQ location controls (2)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country of plant location dummies (11)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region of plant location controls (2)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry dummies (23)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Other controls (56)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region of plant location dummies (111)  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country of CHQ country location 
dummies (32)  No  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Clustering  CHQ location  CHQ location  CHQ location  CHQ by plant 
location 
CHQ by plant 
location 
CHQ by plant 
location 
CHQ by plant 
location 
Instruments              Somatic dist. 
Religious dist. 
First stage F-test              18.19 
Hansen overidentification test (p-
value)              0.853 
Notes:  * significant at 10%; **  5%; *** at 1%. Dependent variable is the decentralization z-score index, measured by plant manager’s autonomy over hiring, investment, products 
and pricing. Columns (1) and (2) include all firms whose CHQ is located in a different region within the same country, or in a different country; Columns (3)-(8) include only foreign multinationals. 
Estimation  by OLS in columns (1)-(6) and IV in column (7). Instruments are “religious diversity” and “somatic distance” between each country pair. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered as 
noted: “CHQ by plant location” indicates clustering within each country origin by country of location cell. TRUST measures the percentage of individuals who agreed with the statement “most people can 
be trusted” in the geography of firm's CHQ region or country of location. BILATERAL TRUST measures the percentage of people from country of origin who report to “trust a lot” people living in the 
country of firm’s location. “Country of CHQ location controls” are the log of  GDP per capita and population in the country of CHQ location. “Region of plant location” controls are the 
log of GDP per capita and population in the region where the plant is located. “Industry dummies” are 2 digits SIC dummies. “Other controls” include a dummy for whether the firm 
is publicly listed, a dummy for whether the CEO is on the same site as the plant (“CEO onsite”) and “Noise controls” (these include 44 interviewer dummies, 6 dummies to control for 
the day of the week the interview took place, an interview reliability score, the manager’s seniority and tenure and the duration of the interview. Regressions weighted by the share of 
World Values Survey respondents in the region in the country, as survey sample sizes (and thus survey measure error) varied by region. This weight is set to one if the plant belongs to 
a foreign multinational since we have no region for the multinationals parent. 
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TABLE 3 - DECENTRALIZATION AND TRUST; ROBUSTNESS 













Religion  Competition  All 
 
Trust   0.608***  0.575**  0.618***  0.590***  0.689***  0.597***  0.612*** 
Trust in CHQ region/country of location  (0.220)  (0.224)  (0.218)  (0.217)  (0.182)  (0.218)  (0.175) 
Management     0.179***          0.158*** 
    (0.041)          (0.038) 
Bonus      0.373**        0.417*** 
      (0.172)        (0.120) 
Family management        -0.101      0.032 
        (0.062)      (0.045) 
Hierarchical religion          -0.004***    -0.004** 
          (0.002)    (0.002) 
Competition            0.152***  0.069** 
            (0.044)  (0.027) 
Observations  3,655  3,655  3,655  3,655  3,655  3,655  3,655 
Country of CHQ location controls (2)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country of plant location dummies(11)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region of plant location controls (2)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry dummies (148)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Other controls (56)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Clustering  CHQ location  CHQ location  CHQ location  CHQ location  CHQ location  CHQ location  CHQ location 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Dependent variable is the decentralization z-score index, measured by plant manager’s autonomy over 
hiring, investment, products, and pricing. Estimation by OLS with robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by the firm’s headquarter region of location 
(country of origin if the plant belongs to a foreign multinational). TRUST measures the percentage of individuals who agreed with the statement “most people can be trusted” in 
the firm’s headquarter region of location (country of origin if the plant belongs to a foreign multinational). MANAGEMENT is the firm-level Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) 
management score. BONUS is the percentage of managerial compensation tied to individual, team, and firm performance. FAMILY MANAGEMENT is a dummy equal to one 
if the firm is owned and run by family members. HIERARCHICAL RELIGION is the percentage of people belonging to a hierarchical religion in the region of plant location as 
recorded by the WVS (see text for the definition of hierarchical religions). COMPETITION is a variable measuring the number of the firm’s direct competitors, as perceived by 
the plant manager (0=no competitors, 1=between 1 and 5 competitors; 3=more than 5 competitors). “Country of CHQ location controls” are the log of GDP per capita and 
population in the country of CHQ location. “Region of plant location” controls are the log of GDP per capita and population in the region where the plant is located. “Industry 
dummies” are 3 digits SIC dummies. “Other controls” include a dummy for whether the firm is publicly listed, a dummy for whether the CEO is on the same site as the plant 
(“CEO onsite”), and “Noise controls” (these include 44 interviewer dummies, 6 dummies to control for the day of the week the interview took place, an interview reliability 
score, the manager’s seniority and tenure, and the duration of the interview). Regressions weighted by the share of World Values Survey respondents in the region in the country, 
with the weight set to one if the plant belongs to a foreign multinational. 
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Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable is ln(mean employees 
per firm) in the population of all manufacturing firms in that country region. Standard errors are clustered by the trust 
in the area where the plant is located. “Sample” reports the size cut off for inclusion in the sample—for example in 
column (1) all firms with over 100 employees were used to calculate the log mean employees per firm. “Trust” 
measures the percentage of individuals in the region’s country of location who agreed with the statement “most people 
can be trusted.” “Rule of Law” measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of 
crime and violence in the firm’s country of location. The index is compiled by the World Bank (Kauffman et al., 
2007), and ranges between -2.5 and 2.5. Regional controls are ln(GDP per capita), ln(population), and the proportion 
of employees with a college degree in the region.  
 
TABLE 4 
FIRM SIZE AND TRUST 
 
Dependent variable: 
ln(mean employees per firm) 
         
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 










           
Trust (region)  2.216***  1.921**  1.784*  1.668*  1.659* 
Trust measured in firm's region of 
location  (0.478)  (0.920)  (0.904)  (0.885)  (0.901) 
Rule of Law (country)  0.476***         
(-2.5=low, 2.5=high)  (0.079)         
           
Observations  110  110  110  110  110 
Regional controls (3)  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country dummies (11)  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   41 
TABLE 5: DECENTRALIZATION AND FIRM-LEVEL PRODUCTIVITY 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 











employee)  TFP 
Sample  All  All  Sub-Sample with IT data  Foreign Multinationals 
Estimation method  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  IV 
Decentralization*ln(IT/Employee)      0.077***  0.052***  0.068***  0.107**   
Decentralization*computers per worker      (0.021)  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.045)   
Bilateral Trust* ln(IT/employee)              0.582* 
              (0.313) 
Decentralization  0.113***  0.009  -0.009         
  (0.016)  (0.014)  (0.017)         
Ln(IT/Employee)      0.131***  0.091***  0.094***  0.120***  -0.098 
ln (computers per worker)      (0.025)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.045)  (0.061) 
Ln(Capital/Employee)  0.476***  0.355***  0.305***  0.373***  0.376***  0.304***   
ln (capital per employee)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.022)  (0.040)  (0.037)  (0.073)   
Decentralization*ln(Capital/Employee)          -0.103***     
          (0.035)     
Ln(Skills)    0.065***  0.055***         
ln (% employees with a degree)    (0.014)  (0.020)         
               
Firms  2,024  2,024  679  679  679  155  155 
Observations  13,826  13,826  3,329  3,329  3,329  759  759 
Country and industry controls   No  Yes  Yes  -  -  -  - 
Other controls   No  Yes  Yes  -  -  -  - 
Firm fixed effects  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
First stage F-test              11.89 
Hansen overidentification test (p-value)              0.534 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Estimation by OLS with standard errors are clustered at the firm level in parentheses. The 
dependent variable is ln(real sales per employee) in all columns except column (7) where it is TFP estimated by the Olley-Pakes (1996) method separately by two-digit industry. 
Decentralization is a z-score index, measured by the degree of plant manager’s autonomy over hiring, investment, products, and pricing. IT is the number of computers per 
employee. IT and Decentralization are centered at the mean values of the columns (3)–(5) sub-sample. “Country and industry” controls include a full set of country and three digit 
industry dummies. All columns control for ln(employment) and column (5) also includes decentralization*ln(employment). “Other controls” includes a full set of noise controls 
and controls for consolidation status and public listing. The two instruments in column (7) are the interaction of religious distance and IT and the interaction of somatic distance 
and IT.  The bottom row reports the F-test of these two instruments in the first stage. Sample “All” includes firms with accounting information on capital, labour, sales, and CEP 
organizational data (columns (1) and (2)); columns (3)–(5) are on the sub-sample “All” where we also have IT data (from the Harte-Hanks survey) and columns (6) and (7) is the 
sub-sample of this which are also foreign multinationals (i.e. as in Table 2 columns (4)–(7)).   42 
NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION 
 
APPENDIX A: DATA 
 
This describes the steps for constructing the data used in the paper. Note that the full dataset is 
also available on-line with all Stata do-files here http://www.stanford.edu/~nbloom/org.zip 
 
A1. Firm-level Accounting Databases 
 
Our sampling frame was based on the Bureau van Dijk (BVD) Amadeus dataset for Europe 
(France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal, and the United Kingdom), on BVD Icarus for 
the United States, on CMIE Firstsource dataset for India, and on the BVD Oriana dataset for 
China and Japan. These databases all provide sufficient information on companies to conduct a 
stratified telephone survey (company name, address, and a size indicator). These databases also 
typically have accounting information on employment, sales, and capital. Apart from size, we did 
not insist on having accounting information to form the sampling population, however. 
 
Amadeus and Firstsource are constructed from a range of sources, primarily the National registries 
of companies (such as Companies House in the United Kingdom and the Registry of Companies in 
India). Icarus is constructed from the Dun & Bradstreet database, which is a private database of 
over 5 million U.S. trading locations built up from credit records, business telephone directories, 
and direct research. Oriana is constructed from Huaxia credit in China and Teikoku Database in 
Japan, covering all public and all private firms with one of the following: 150 or more employees, 
10 million US$ of sales or 20 million US$ of assets. 
 
In addition to using these accounting databases for the sampling frame we also use them to 
conduct the analysis of firm size in Table 4. Since our measure of decentralization focuses on the 
delegation of power between the company headquarters and the plant manager, firm size is the 
appropriate concept to use rather than plant size. Census data do not report firm sizes on a 
consistent basis across countries, which is why we use the BVD and CMIE datasets. We discuss 
issues of representativeness below in sub-section A2. 
 
 
A2. The Organizational Survey 
 
In every country the sampling frame for the organization survey was all firms with a 
manufacturing primary industry code with between 100 and 5,000 employees on average over the 
most recent three years of data (typically 2002 to 2004).
42
                                                 
42 In the United States only the most recent year of employment is provided. In India employment is not reported for 
private firms, so for these companies we used forecast employment, predicted from their total assets (which are 
reported) using the coefficients from regressing ln(employees) on ln(assets) for public firms. 
  In Japan and China we used all 
manufacturing firms with 150 to 5000 employees since Oriana only samples firms with over 150   43 




We checked the results by conditioning on common size bands (above 150 in all countries). 
Interviewers were each given a randomly selected list of firms from the sampling frame. This 
should therefore be representative of medium sized manufacturing firms. The size of this sampling 
frame by country is shown in Table A4, together with information on firm size. Looking at Table 
A4 two points are worth highlighting on the sampling frame. First, the size of the sampling frame 
appears broadly proportional to the absolute size of each country’s manufacturing base, with 




 Second, China has the largest firms on average, presumably reflecting both the higher 
size cut-off for its sampling frame (150 employees versus 100 employees for other countries) and 
also the presence of many current and ex state-owned enterprises (11% in the survey are still 
Government owned). When we condition on the sample of firms with more than 150 employees in 
all countries, median employment for Chinese firms is still relatively high, but lower than the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and Sweden. Third, Greece and India have a much higher 
share of publicly quoted firms then the other countries, with this presumably reflecting their more 
limited provision of data on privately held firms. Because of this potential bias across countries 
will control for firm size and listing status in all the main regressions. 
In addition to randomly surveying from the sampling frame described above we also resurveyed 
the firms we interviewed in the 2004 survey wave used in Bloom and Van Reenen (2007). This 
was a sample of 732 firms from France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, 
with a manufacturing primary industry code and 50 to 10,000 employees (on average between 
2000 and 2003). This sample was drawn from the Amadeus dataset for Europe and the Compustat 
dataset for the U.S. Only companies with accounting data were selected. So, for the United 
Kingdom  and France this sampling frame was very similar to the 2006 sampling frame. For 
Germany it is more heavily skewed towards publicly quoted firms since smaller privately held 
firms do not report balance sheet information. For the United States it comprised only publicly 
quoted firms. As a result when we present results we always include controls for firm size. As a 
robustness test we drop the firms that were resurveyed from 2004. These resurveyed firms were 
randomly distributed among the relevant country interviewers. 
  
The Representativeness of the Sampling Frame 
 
The accounting databases are used to generate our organizational survey and also used directly in 
the analysis of the firm size distribution in Table 4. How does this compare to Census data? Table 
A5 compares the number of employees for different size bands from our sample with the figures 
for the corresponding manufacturing populations obtained from national Census Bureau data from 
each of the twelve countries.  Unfortunately,  figures for the population distributions are not 
available from every country in the same format, but all our countries do report the number of 
                                                 
43 Note that the Oriana database does include firms with less than 150 employees if they meet the sales or assets 
criteria, but we excluded this to avoid using a selected sample. 
44 The size of the manufacturing sector can be obtained from http://laborsta.ilo.org/, a database maintained by ILO. 
Indian data can be obtained from Indiastat, from the “Employment in Industry” table.   44 
employees in enterprises with over 50 or more employees (except the United States, where the 
threshold is 20 or 100) so we report this. 
 
Note that there are several reasons for mismatch between Census data and firm level accounts. 
First, even though we only use unconsolidated firm accounts, employment may include some jobs 
in overseas branches. Second, the time of when employment is recorded in a Census year will 
differ from that recorded in firm accounts (see base of each column in Table A5). Third, the 
precise definition of “enterprise” in the Census may not correspond to the “firm” in company 
accounts (see notes in table for exact definitions). Fourth, we keep firms whose primary industry is 
manufacturing whereas Census data includes only plants whose primary industry code is 
manufacturing. Fifth, there may be duplication of employment in accounting databases due to the 
treatment of consolidated accounts.
45
 
 Finally, reporting of employment is not mandatory for the 
accounts of all firms in all countries. This was particularly a problem for Indian and Japanese 
firms, so for these countries we imputed the missing employment numbers using a sales 
regression.  
Despite these potential differences, the broad picture that from Table A5 is that in eight countries 
the sample matches up reasonably  with the population of medium sized manufacturing firms 
(being within 17% above or below the Census total employment number). This suggests our 
sampling frame covers near to the population of all firms for most countries.  
 
In two countries the coverage from accounting databases underestimates the aggregate:  the 
Swedish data covers only 62% of Census data and the Portuguese accounting database covers 
72%. This is due to incomplete coverage in ORBIS of these smaller nations. In the United States 
and Japan the accounting databases appears to overestimate the employment of manufacturing 
firms compared to Census data, by about 36%. We think this is due to some double counting of 
the employment of subsidiaries due to imperfect recording of the consolidation markers in 
Japanese and U.S. accounts. 
 
These issues will be a problem if our sampling frame is non-randomly omitting firms—for 
example under-representing smaller firms—because it would bias our cross-country comparisons. 
We try a couple of approaches to try and address this. First, in almost all the tables of results we 
include country fixed-effects to try to control for any differences across countries in sample 
selection bias. Hence, our  key results are identified by within country and region variation. 
Second, in our quantification analysis when we compare across countries we control for size, 
public listing status, and industry. This should help to condition on the types of factors that lead to 
under/over sampling of firms. Since these factors explain only a limited share of cross country 
variation in decentralization this suggests this differential sampling bias is not likely to be 
particularly severe.  Finally, we also present experiments where we drop the four possibly 
problematic countries (Japan, Portugal, Sweden, and the United States) from the analysis to show 
                                                 
45  Table A5 is built omitting all consolidated accounts to avoid duplications. Still, for some companies the 
consolidated accounts marker is sometimes missing so that duplications might still be present causing a “double 
counting” problem.   45 
that the results are robust. In the specification of column (2) in Table 4 the coefficient on trust 
actually rose to 2.048 (standard error = 0.961) even though we now have only 81 regions. 
 
The Survey Response Rate 
 
As shown in Table A6 of the firms we contacted 44.9% took part in the survey: a high success rate 
given the voluntary nature of participation. Of the remaining firms 16.8% refused to be surveyed, 
while the remaining 38.3% were in the process of being scheduled when the survey ended.  
 
The reason for this high share of “scheduling in progress” firms was the need for interviewers to 
keep a portfolio of firms who they cycle though when trying to set up interviews. Since 
interviewers only ran an average of 2.8 interviews a day the majority of their time was spent trying 
to contact managers to schedule future interviews. For scheduling it was efficient for interviewers 
to keep a stock of between 100 to 500 firms to cycle through. The optimal level of this stock 
varied by the country—in the United States and the United Kingdom many managers operated 
voicemail, so that large stocks of firms were needed. In Japan after two weeks the team switched 
from working Japanese hours (midnight to 8am) to Japanese afternoons and THE UNITED 




Continental Europe, in contrast, managers typically had personnel assistants rather than voicemail, 
who wanted to see Government endorsement materials before connecting with the managers. So 
each approach was more time consuming, requiring a smaller stock of firms. 
The ratio of successful interviews to rejections (ignoring “scheduling in progress”) is above 1 in 
every country. Hence, managers typically agreed to the survey proposition when interviewers were 
able to connect with them. This agreement ratio is lowest in China and Japan. There were two 
reasons for this: first, the Chinese and Japanese firms did appear to be genuinely more willing to 
refuse to be interviewed; and second, the time-zone meant that our interviewers could not talk 
during the Chinese or Japanese morning; which sometimes led to rejections if managers were too 
busy to talk in the afternoon. 
 
Table A7 analyses the probability of being interviewed.
47
                                                 
46 After two weeks of the Japanese team working midnight to 8am it became clear this schedule was not sustainable 
due to the unsociability of the hours, with one of the Japanese interviewers quitting. The rest of the team then 
switched to working 4am until noon.  
  In all columns, we compare the 
probability of running an interview conditional on contacting the firm, so include rejections and 
“scheduling in progress”  firms in the baseline. The decision to accept is uncorrelated with 
revenues per worker, firm age and listed status. The probability of being interviewed is also 
uncorrelated with the average level of trust and the percentage of hierarchical religions in the 
region. Large firms and multinationals did appear to be more predisposed to agree to be 
interviewed, although the size of this effect if not large—multinationals were about 11 percentage 
points more likely to agree to the interview and firms about 10 percentage points more likely for a 
doubling in size. Firms that were contacted earlier on in the survey were also significantly more 
likely to end up being interviewed, with firms contacted at the beginning of the survey over 8 
47  Note this sample is smaller than the total survey sample because some firms do not report data for certain 
explanatory variables, for example U.S. private firms do not report sales.   46 
percentage points more likely to be interviewed than those contacted towards the end (3 months 
later). The reason is that firms contacted early on in the survey were subsequently contacted many 
more times as interviewers cycled through their stocks of “scheduling in progress firms.” Finally, 
compared to the United States, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Poland, Portugal,  and 
Sweden had significantly higher conditional acceptance rate—while China had a significantly 
lower acceptance rate. Column (2) shows that the likelihood of a contacted firm eventually being 
interviewed is also uncorrelated with return on capital employed, a basic profits measure. 
 
So, in summary, respondents were not significantly more productive or profitable than non-
responders. Firms contacted earlier on in the survey process were more likely to end up being 
interviewed. Respondents did tend to be slightly larger and more likely to be a multinational 
subsidiary, but were not more likely to be stock-market listed or older. Chinese and Japanese firms 
were less likely to respond and European firms were more likely to respond. Note, however, that 
we address this potential source of bias including in all regressions controls for size, multinational 
status, and country dummies. 
 
Firm-level variables 
Our firm accounting data on sales, employment, capital, profits, shareholder equity, long-term 
debt, market values (for quoted firms), and wages (where available) came from BVD Amadeus 
dataset for Europe (France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal and the United Kingdom.), 
from BVD Icarus for the United States, from CMIE Firstsource dataset for India, and from the 
BVD Oriana dataset for China and Japan. Sales are deflated by a three digit industry producer 
price index. 
 
BVD and CMIE also have extensive information on ownership structure, so we can use this to 
identify whether the firm was part of a multinational enterprise. We also asked specific questions 
on the multinational status of the firm (whether it owned plants aboard and the country where the 
parent company is headquartered) to be able to distinguish domestic multinationals from foreign 
multinationals. 
 
We collected many variables through our survey including information on plant size, skills, 
organization, etc. as described in the main text. We asked the manager to estimate how many 
competitors he thought he faced (top-coded at 10 or more), which was used to construct the firm-
level competition variable (see next sub-section for the other industry-level competition 
measures). We also collected management practices data  in the survey. These were scored 
following the methodology of Bloom and Van Reenen (2007), with practices grouped into four 
areas:  operations  (three practices), monitoring  (five practices),  targets  (five practices),  and 
incentives (five practices). The shop-floor operations section focuses on the introduction of lean 
manufacturing techniques, the documentation of processes improvements, and the rationale behind 
introductions of improvements. The monitoring section focuses on the tracking of performance of 
individuals, reviewing performance, and consequence management. The targets section examines 
the type of targets, the realism of the targets, the transparency of targets,  and the range and 
interconnection of targets. Finally, the incentives section includes promotion criteria, pay and 
bonuses, and fixing or firing bad performers, where best practice is deemed the approach that 
gives strong rewards for those with both ability and effort. Our management measure uses the un-
weighted average of the z-scores of all 18 dimensions.   47 
 
A.3 Industries and Industry level data 
Our basic industry code is the U.S. SIC (1997) three digit level—which is our common industry 
definition in all countries. We allocate each firm to its main three digit sector (based on sales). For 
the 3,655 firms in the sample we have 134 unique three-digit industries. There are at least ten 
sampled firms in each industry for 96.9% of the sample. 
 
 
A.4 Regional and National Data 
 
Trust: the World Values Survey 
The regional trust and religion variables have been calculated from the World Values Survey 
(WVS). The WVS is a cross-country project coordinated by the Institute for Social Research of the 
University of Michigan, under the direction of Ronald Inglehart. Each wave carries out 
representative surveys of the basic values and beliefs of individuals in a large cross-section of 
countries. The questionnaire contains answers to specific questions about religion and social 
attitudes, including several question on generalized and specific trust (e.g. trust in the family, 
government etc.), as well as detailed information on the social and education background of the 
respondents (age, income, and  education).  The key question we use is the standard one: 
“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too 
careful in dealing with people?” 
 
The WVS data can be downloaded freely from the WVS website (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). 
For the purposes of our analysis, we use only individual entries with information on the 
respondents’ region of residence. We pool together data relative to four successive waves of data 
collection (1981–1984, 1989–1993, 1994–1999 and 1999–2004. We use the WVS for all countries 
with the exception of Greece, for which the regional breakdown provided by the WVS is poor. 
Luckily, we can build regional aggregates of trust and religion using the European Social Survey 
(ESS, http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org), a biennial multi-country survey covering over 30 
European nations, and including questions on trust and religion. The wording of the trust question 
is identical to the one used by the WVS, although the answers are coded on a scale from 1 to 10, 
instead of the discrete 0/1 choices adopted by the WVS. To ensure comparability between 
countries, we convert into 1s all the answers greater than 5. The first round of the ESS was fielded 
in 2002/2003, the second in 2004/2005 and the third in 2006/2007. We pool across all waves of 
the ESS. The frequencies by country and wave are shown in Table A8. 
 
European Commission Bilateral Trust Data 
This comes directly from Table 1; panel B of Guiso et al. (2009). They averaged over multiple 
waves of a Eurobarometer survey carried out for the European Commission from the 1970s 
onwards. The question is: “I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in 
people from various countries. For each, please tell me whether you have a lot of trust, some trust, 
not very much trust, or no trust at all.” This was asked to all European Union Member States about 
each other and a number of other countries (including the United States, China, and Japan). We 
allocated the bilateral trust measure across the multinational subsidiaries included in our sample 
using information on the country where the parent company is headquartered and on the country 
where the subsidiary itself is located. So, for example, the measure of bilateral trust reported by   48 
Swedish people towards Italians would be allocated to the subsidiary of a Swedish multinational 
located in Italy. 
 
Regional Firm Size and Share of Manufacturing Employment 
Average regional firm size and the industry share of employment in each region by SIC2 were 
computed using employment data on the population of all public and private firms included in the 
BVD and CMIE accounting databases described above. The data refers mostly to 2006 (earlier 
years of the accounting data have been used whenever 2006 was not available, as long as the firm 
appeared to be still active). Since the accounting databases did not always provide information on 
the region of location of the firm, each firm was allocated to a region or state according to the 
headquarter postcode whenever this was available. If the postcode was not available, information 
on the city of location was used to map the firm into a specific region or state. With this 
procedure, we obtained regional information for virtually all firms included in the databases. 
 
GDP per Capita and Population 
The regional GDP per capita and population variables are drawn from the following sources: 
Europe: Eurostat, Regional Statistics,
48 United States: Bureau of Economic Analysis, regional 
Statistics,
49  Japan: Japan Statistic Bureau, Prefectural Statistics,
50  China: Province data from 
Chinadataonline.org,




 The data refers to 2006 and is expressed in national currencies (country dummies are 
included in all regressions). 
Rule of Law 
The Rule of Law variable measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as 
well as the likelihood of crime and violence. The index is compiled by the World Bank (Kauffman 
et al., 2007), and ranges between -2.5 and 2.5. The data can be downloaded from: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/resources.htm. 
 
Bilateral-trust instrumental variables: 
Somatic distance: This is obtained using the data from Guiso et al. (2009) for most of our 
Europeans countries, and their methodology to extend to the rest of Europe, China, and the United 
States. Quoting from their paper: 
“We derive an indicator of somatic distance, based on the average frequency of specific 
traits in the indigenous population reported in Biasutti (1954). For height, hair color 
(pigmentation), and cephalic index (the ratio of the length and width of the skull), Biasutti 
(1954) draws a map of the prevailing traits in each country in Europe. For each trait, 
European Union countries fall into three different categories. For hair color we have 
“Blond prevails,” “Mix of blond and dark,” and “Dark prevails.” We arbitrarily assign 
the score of 1 to the first, 2 to the second and 3 to the third. When one’s country somatic 





52 http://mospi.nic.in/cso_test1.htm   49 
characteristics belong to more than one category, we take the country’s most prevalent 
category. We then compute the somatic distance between two countries as the sum of the 
absolute value of the difference in each of these traits” (quoted page # here). 
We extend this by collecting data for China and Poland from Biasutti (1954), assuming 
Luxembourg has the average values for France and Germany, and the United States has the values 
of its European immigrants, weighted by their ancestry shares reported in 1999 U.S. Census. We 
use only European immigrants because they appear overwhelmingly to be the owners and 
managers of the types of medium sized manufacturing firms in our survey. 
 
Religious distance: Again, this is obtained from Guiso et al. (2009) for most of our European 
countries, and their methodology to extend to the rest of Europe, China, and the United States. 
Quoting from their paper: 
“The first proxy for culture is an indicator of religious similarity equal to the empirical 
probability that two randomly chosen individuals in two countries will share the same 
religion. We obtain this measure by taking the product of the fraction of individuals in 
country j and in country i who have religion k and then we sum across all religions k (k = 
Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, Orthodox, no-religion, other 
affiliation). To calculate this variable we use the percentage of people belonging to each 
religious denomination from the World Values Survey” (quoted page # here). 
We extend this to all other necessary country-pairs using the World Values Survey. 
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APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
 
Industry structure and decentralization 
The factors that facilitate greater decentralization within firms should also influence industry 
composition across regions and countries. If some industries require greater decentralization for 
efficient production—for example if they are technologically fast moving—then we should see 
these located in higher trust areas. To investigate this we calculated an “implied industry 
decentralization,” IDj, for each region as follows: 
 
where j denotes region and k denotes two digit industry, Ejk is the share of employment in each 
two digit industry in each region calculated from the population of all public and private firms in 
that region (see Appendix A), and Dk is the average decentralization value for that industry in our 
sample in the United Kingdom. We choose the United Kingdom as the base country because (a) it 
is a high-trust and Rule of Law country where firms are likely to be closer to being optimally 
decentralized, and (b) we have a large sample of firms in the United Kingdom spread across every 
industry enabling us to generate industry level decentralization measures.
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 In the regressions we 
then drop the United Kingdom, so that our survey data used to generate industry implied 
decentralization does not overlap with the regions in the regression. 
In Table B1 we regress IDk the implied industry decentralization measure against trust in the 
region in column (1) and obtain a significant and positive impact. This implies that high trust 
regions tend to specialize in industries that are more decentralized. In column (2) we add Rule of 
Law, which varies only by country, and find a similar result: strong Rule of Law countries have 
more employment in decentralized  industries. In column (3) we include a full set of country 
controls, and the trust variable, finding similar point estimates but larger standard errors. 
 
In summary, an interpretation of our results is that trust fosters greater decentralization through 
enabling countries to specialize in industries where decentralization matters more, through 
fostering FDI and larger firms. Furthermore, even conditional on industry, size, and multinational 
status, high trust regions have more decentralized organizations. Before linking these relations 
with productivity in the next section, we will examine other determinants of decentralization. 
 
 
Further Robustness tests  
We present some further robustness tests of the effect of trust on decentralization in Tables B2–B4 
as  discussed in sub-section V.C.  Column (1) of Table B2 has the baseline results which 
correspond to column (4) of Table 1. As noted in sub-section V.A, the difference in the trust 
                                                 
53 We have 570 observations in the United Kingdom. The other potential base-country to use is the United States with 
643 observations. We choose the United Kingdom as: (i) it has a more even coverage across industries than the United 
States, which has some industries with small firm numbers; and (ii) it has fewer regions than the United States, so 
since we drop the base country this allows for a larger regression sample. Re-estimating using the United States 
numbers also gives significant trust and rule-of-law results, with for example, the standard errors (point estimates) 
0.209 (.037) and 0.059 (0.011) respectively in columns (1) and (2). 
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coefficients between plants where the CEO was on-site and off-site (see last two columns of Table 
1) was not simply due to firm size. When we split the sample into large firms (column (2)) and 
small firms (column (3) the trust coefficient is positive and significant and similar in magnitude 
both sub-samples. We also tested the robustness of the main results to the inclusion of other 
variables related to the social capital literature, such as the strength of norms of civic cooperation. 
To this end, we looked at the correlation between decentralization and the variable CIVIC (Knack 
and Keefer, 1997), which records the degree to which several “uncivil” behaviors (such as 
claiming government benefits even if not entitled to, avoiding a fare on public transport, cheating 
taxes, etc.) are perceived to be justified by the population. We did not find any evidence of a 
significant relationship between CIVIC and decentralization, and the inclusion of the variable had 
no virtually no effect on the trust coefficient (see column (4)). Similarly, we tested whether the 
decision to decentralize could be influenced by local preferences for autonomy, rather than trust 
per se. For this purpose, we examined the effect of the variable AUTONOMY, which is derived in 
the World Values Survey from questions assessing the perceived importance of religious faith and 
obedience vs. independence and perseverance in children education. The variable AUTONOMY 
had no significant correlation with decentralization, and it also hardly affected the coefficient on 




Next we analyzed whether the results could be driven by the measurement of trust. In column (6) 
of Table B2 we use the latest wave of the WVS and in column (7) we use just the largest wave of 
the WVS.
55 The coefficient remains positive and significant, but is a little smaller in magnitude 
than when we use the baseline. This is consistent with the fact that we are using less data to 
estimate trust in the region and this could generate some attenuation bias towards zero. In column 
(8) we drop Greece as the Greek data were obtained from a different survey from the WVS as the 
geographical coverage was so poor.
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 The trust coefficient is a little larger than in the baseline 
results. 
In Table B3 we again present the baseline in column (1), but then analyze the extent to which the 
association between trust and decentralization could be affected by measurement problems in our 
decentralization variable. We first disaggregate the decentralization measure into its four 
component parts. Column (2) presents the index in terms of hiring autonomy and column (3) in 
terms of “budget autonomy” (i.e. the question on the mount a plant manager could spend on 
capital equipment without getting approval from the headquarters). In both regressions trust is 
positive and significant. Since there is censoring at zero for autonomy over investment we also 
present a tobit estimation in column (4), which also shows a significant relationship. Autonomy 
over marketing is in column (5), and new product introduction in column (6). Only the marketing 
decentralization indicator is insignificant, but this is an item that plant managers rarely have any 
control over, so perhaps this is not too surprising. We also considered different binary 
representations of the dependent variable. In column (7) we defined a binary dummy for 
                                                 
54 CIVIC and AUTONOMY were not correlated with decentralization even when we omitted trust from the set of 
regressors. 
55 In these regressions we also included fixed effect for the years in which the WVS waves were conducted, which 
would differ across countries.  
56 For Greece we used instead the European Values Survey, which provided a richer regional coverage than the WVS. 
See Appendix A for details.    52 
decentralization if a firm was in the 25th percentile of the autonomy distribution across all four 
indicators and zero otherwise. Probit estimation of this regression also revealed a positive and 
significant correlation of this indicator with trust. The final column drops the continuous 
investment question and uses z-scores solely on the categorical measures, again revealing a 
positive correlation. In short, Table B3 suggests that the results are not driven by the functional 
form of our decentralization measure. 
 
 
Finally in Table B4, we investigated whether the bilateral trust results shown in Table 2 were 
robust to the introduction of other geographical, historical, and institutional variables specific to 
the country of origin and country of location match, and that could be correlated with bilateral 
trust and affect decentralization. We begin by reproducing the baseline OLS estimates from 
column (6) in Table 2. Column (2) then includes several of the key  controls from the trade 
literature on gravity: physical distance between the country of the headquarters and the subsidiary, 
whether the countries are contiguous, whether they are tied by a common language and whether 
they are tied by a colonial past or common legal origin. Column (3) reproduces our baseline IV 
estimates from column (7) of Table 2 and column (4) then adds in the same controls as column 
(2). 
 
Table B4 shows that within multinationals, decentralization was not significantly affected by 
geographical distance, although contiguity between countries was associated with less 
decentralization perhaps because monitoring was easier. Sharing the same language or the same 
legal origin (La Porta et al., 1999) appears to be positively but insignificantly correlated with 
decentralization. We also find  that decentralization was significantly higher when the 
multinational country of origin and the country of plant location shared a colonial tie in the past, a 
finding that might reflect the importance of long  run business ties between countries. 
Reassuringly, we find that the coefficient on bilateral trust was hardly affected by these additional 
covariates, both in the OLS and IV estimates, when we included the additional controls 






                                                 
57 When we examined the individual effect of the controls for geographical, institutional, or legal proximity, the 
strongest effect on the significance of bilateral trust was found when we introduced the variables capturing similarities 
in legal origins and language. This is unsurprising, given the importance of law and language in shaping cultural 
beliefs, including trust between countries.   53 
APPENDIX TABLE A1 
DETAILS OF THE DECENTRALIZATION SURVEY QUESTIONS 
 
For Questions D1, D3, and D4 any score can be given, but the scoring guide is only provided for scores of 1, 3, and 5. 
Question D1: “To hire a FULL-TIME PERMANENT SHOPFLOOR worker what agreement would your plant need from CHQ (Central Head 
Quarters)?” 
Probe until you can accurately score the question—for example if they say “It is my decision, but I need sign-off from corporate HQ.” ask “How often would 
sign-off be given?” 
    Score 1  Score 3  Score 5 
  Scoring grid:  No authority—even for replacement 
hires 
Requires sign-off from CHQ based on 
the business case. Typically agreed 
(i.e. about 80% or 90% of the time). 
Complete authority—it is my decision entirely 
 
Question D2: “What is the largest CAPITAL INVESTMENT your plant could make without prior authorization from CHQ?” 
Notes: (a) Ignore form-filling 
            (b) Please cross check any zero response by asking “What about buying a new computer—would that be possible?” and then probe…. 
            (c) Challenge any very large numbers (e.g. >$¼m in US) by asking “To confirm your plant could spend $X on a new piece of equipment without prior 
clearance from CHQ?” 
            (d) Use the national currency and do not omit zeros (i.e. for a U.S. firm twenty thousand dollars would be 20000). 
Question D3: “Where are decisions taken on new product introductions—at the plant, at the CHQ or both”? 
Probe until you can accurately score the question—for example if they say “It is complex, we both play a role,” ask “Could you talk me through the process 
for a recent product innovation?” 
    Score 1  Score 3  Score 5 
  Scoring grid:  All new product introduction 
decisions are taken at the CHQ 
 
New product introductions are jointly 
determined by the plant and CHQ 
All new product introduction decisions taken at 
the plant level 
Question D4: “How much of sales and marketing is carried out at the plant level (rather than at the CHQ)”? 
Probe until you can accurately score the question. Also take an average score for sales and marketing if they are taken at different levels. 
    Score 1  Score 3  Score 5 
  Scoring grid:  None—sales and marketing is all run 
by CHQ 
Sales and marketing decisions are split 
between the plant and CHQ 
 
The plant runs all sales and marketing 
Question D5: “Is the CHQ on the site being interviewed”? 
 
Notes: The electronic survey, training materials and survey video footage are available on http://cep.lse.ac.uk/management/default.asp  
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TABLE A2 
DECENTRALIZATION: INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS BY COUNTRY 
 
 
 Hiring         
(1 to 5) 
Marketing      
 (1 to 5) 
 Product Introduction      
(1 to 5) 
 Investment  (Median, in $) 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
China  3.20  1.43  1.75  604 
France  2.80  1.98  2.21  9,375 
Germany  2.93  2.17  2.57  12,500 
Greece  2.44  1.39  1.80  1,250 
India  2.77  1.79  2.16  220 
Italy  2.84  1.93  2.38  6,250 
Japan  1.96  1.70  1.91  1,720 
Poland  2.86  2.04  2.30  310 
Portugal  3.03  1.76  2.37  3,125 
Sweden  3.57  2.47  2.83  13,800 
United Kingdom  3.46  2.53  2.53  9,150 
United States  3.86  2.17  2.58  7,500 
 
Notes: Averages of the individual components of the decentralization variable by country (N=3,380)   55 
TABLE A3 
THE SURVEY SAMPLE DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
   All  CN  FR  GE  GR  IN  IT  JP  PO  PT  SW  UK  US  Missing, 
# 
Observations, #  4,038  325  323  348  187  470  204  122  239  177  286  649  694  n/a 
Firms, #  3,902  319  313  308  187  467  207  121  239  177  259  609  682  n/a 
Firms, excluding 
2004 resurvey, #      242  225                560  535  n/a 
Firm employees 
(median)  270  700  240  500  230  250  185  310  250  183  267  250  375  0 
Firm employees excl. 
2004 resurvey      200  325                250  300  n/a 
Plant employees 
(median)  150  500  150  225  120  150  150  150  150  125  150  140  150  0 
Production sites 
(median), #  2  1  3  2  1  1  2  2  1  1  2  2  3  94 
Age of firm 
34  12  39  40  32  22  33  57  31  35  62  34  33  101 
(median, years) 
Listed firm, %  14.5  6.4  4.6  16.4  18.7  26.2  1.4  28.3  2.3  5.6  1.7  6.5  30.1  121 
Share of workforce 
with degrees %  17.3  8  17.3  14.9  11.9  22  16.3  30.9  20  9.6  19.8  12.9  20.1  436 
Management (mean)   2.99  2.61  2.99  3.18  2.64  2.54  3  3.15  2.88  2.73  3.15  3  3.31  0 
Trust, %  38  65  17  33  15  39  40  43  31  16  72  36  42  48 
1-Lerner index  0.957  0.95  0.965  0.949  0.935  0.923  0.965  0.966  0.967  0.972  0.98  0.968  0.94  111 
Foreign 
multinationals, %  0.25  0.2  0.46  0.31  0.19  0.1  0.25  0.03  0.35  0.18  0.44  0.38  0.14  0 
Domestic 
multinationals, %  0.22  0.01  0.34  0.36  0.13  0.02  0.22  0.32  0.04  0.2  0.39  0.25  0.33  0 
Interview duration 
(minutes)  47.9  48.6  46.3  44.7  49.8  59.8  46.6  58.4  47.8  54.5  56.3  43.5  46.8  34 
Trust  0.39  0.54  0.21  0.35  0.23  0.39  0.38  0.42  0.26  0.16  0.66  0.34  0.43  0 
Hierarchy  0.34  0.01  0.56  0.38  0.91  0.11  0.79  0.03  0.94  0.82  0.01  0.18  0.27  395 
GDP per capita (in 
2006 US$)  29,380  333  39,525  40,132  20,871  356  35,812  24,695  7,987  20,926  45,977  49,864  89,968  23 
Regional Pop (‘000)  41,468  161.445  8,077  10,072  2,325  66,085  12,744  27,369  6,663  2,892  1,284  8,467  34,603  23 
Notes: All=All countries combined, CN=China, FR=France, GE=Germany, GR=Greece, IN=India, IT=Italy, JP=Japan, PO=Poland, PT=Portugal, SW=Sweden, UK=United 
Kingdom, US=United States. 3902 firms with 4038 observations, since 136 firms were interviewed twice.   56 
TABLE A4 
THE 2006 SAMPLING FRAME 
 
                           
  CN  FR  GE  GR  IN  IT  JP  PO  PT  SW  UK  US  All 
Sampling frame, 
number of firms (#)  86,733  4,683  9,722  522  31,699  5,182  3,546  3,684  1,687  1,034  5,953  27,795  15,187 
 
Employees (median, 
sampling frame)  290  201  198  180  175  183  240  200  127  206  219  200  202 
 
Employees (median, 
conditioning on firms 
with 150+ employees)  290  291  285  269  229  262  240   260  239  315  311  300  274 
 
Publicly listed (%)  1  4  1  17  11  1  1  3  1  6  4  4  4 
 
Notes: CN=China, FR=France, GE=Germany, GR=Greece, IN=India, IT=Italy, JP=Japan, PO=Poland, PT=Portugal, SW=Sweden, UK=United Kingdom, US=United States. 
Sampling frame is the total number of eligible firms for the survey. The sampling frame includes all firms between 100 and 5,000 employees in the population accounting 
databases for all countries, excluding China and Japan (for which the employment bracket is 150 to 5,000 employees) and Portugal (for which the employment bracket is 75 to 
5,000 employees). Employees are the median number of employees in the firm. Publicly listed is the percentage of firms which are directly publicly listed (note that some firms 
may be privately incorporate subsidiaries of publicly listed parents). Indian and Japanese employment numbers are predicted from balance sheet information for privately held 
firms (India) and unconsolidated accounts (Japan). 
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TABLE A5 
THE COVERAGE OF THE FIRM ACCOUNTING DATABASES  
 
 
  CN  FR  GE  GR  IN  IT  JP  PO  PT  SW  UK  US 
Employees in firms in accounting databases with 50+ 
employees, 000’s  56,742  2,223  6,453  153  6,773  1,754  9,214  1,224  380  331  2,188  15,150 
Employees in firms with 50+ employees in the 
accounting databases as % of Census data  84%  89%  117%  92%  103%  89%  137%  72%  96%  62%  100%  135% 
Sample median year  2007  2006  2006  2006  2004  2006  2007  2006  2006  2006  2006  2007 
Census year  2004  2006  2006  2006  2005  2006  2006  2006  2006  2006  2006  2006 
 
Notes: CN=China, FR=France, GE=Germany, GR=Greece, IN=India, IT=Italy, JP=Japan, PO=Poland, PT=Portugal, SW=Sweden, UK=United Kingdom, US=United States. 
This compares total employment in our accounting database (from which the sampling frame was drawn) that should cover the population of manufacturing firms with Census 
Bureau data (from mandatory government surveys). All census units are firms except India which is plant level. Employees in firms in the accounting databases with 50+ 
employees, 000’s reports the number of employees in firms in the accounting databases with 50 or more employees (in thousands). Employees in firms with 50+ in the 
accounting databases as % of Census data reports the share of employees in the accounting databases in firms with 50 or more employees as a proportion of the values reported 
in national Census data (except for the United States, where we report the share of employees in firms with 20 or more employees as the 50 or more cut-off is not available). 
Census data is drawn from Eurostat Structural Business Statistics for the European countries, Bureau of the Census for the United States, Statistics Bureau for Japan, Annual 
Survey of Industries for India, and Chinese Industrial Survey. For China and India, Census calculations done by Albert Bollard on data provided by Pete Klenow. Consolidated 
accounts are excluded from accounting data to avoid duplications. Eurostat defines an enterprise as the “smallest combination of legal units that is an organizational unit 
producing goods or services, which benefits from a certain degree of autonomy in decision-making, and an enterprise carries out one or more activities at one or more locations.” 
The Bureau of the Census defines an enterprise as “a business organization consisting of one or more domestic establishments under common ownership or control.” The 
Statistics Bureau of Japan defines an enterprise as “an entity composed of the head office and branch establishments, if any, whose legal organization is a stock company, limited 
company, limited or unlimited partnership, limited liability company, or mutual insurance company.” In the Indian Annual Survey of Industries a factory “refers to any whereon 
ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid 
of power, or is ordinarily so carried on, or whereon twenty or more workers are working or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a 
manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on.” In the Chinese Industrial Survey “industrial establishments refer to economic 
units which are located in one single place and engage entirely or primarily in one kind of industrial activity, including financially independent industrial enterprises and units 
engaged in industrial activities under the non industrial enterprises (or financially dependent). Industrial establishments generally meet the following requirements: They have 
each one location and are engaged in one kind of industrial activity each; they operate and manage their industrial production activities separately; they have accounts of income 
and expenditures separately.” 
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TABLE A6 
THE SURVEY RESPONSE RATE 
 
                           
  All  CN  FR  GE  GR  IN  IT  JP  PO  PT  SW  UK  US 
Interviews 
completed (%)   44.9  43.9  59.3  58.6  53.4  61.4  68.2  21.5  37.5  60.5  68.2  32.9  37.2 
Interviews 
refused (%)  16.8  13.7  13.7  27.2  10.7  13.7  20.0  20.1  16.5  15.8  16.9  19.6  13.7 
Scheduling in 
progress (%)  38.3  40.1  27.0  14.2  35.9  25.0  11.8  58.4  46.0  23.7  14.9  47.4  49.1 
Survey sample, 
number firms (#)   8,690  727  528  526  350  761  304  563  637  293  380  1,851  1,833 
Interviews 
completed  (#)  3,902  319  313  308  187  467  207  121  239  177  259  609  682 
 
Notes: All=All countries combined, CN=China, FR=France, GE=Germany, GR=Greece, IN=India, IT=Italy, JP=Japan, PO=Poland, 
PT=Portugal, SW=Sweden, UK=United Kingdom, US=United States. Interviews completed reports the percentage of companies contacted 
for which a management interview was completed. Interviews refused reports the percentage of companies contacted in which the manager 
contacted refused to take part in the interview. Scheduling in progress reports the percentage of companies contacted for which the 
scheduling was still in progress at the end of the survey period (so the firm had been contacted, with no interview run nor any manager 
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TABLE A7 
SELECTION ANALYSIS 
  (1)  (2) 
Sample  All firms contacted  All firms contacted 
Log (Sales/employee)  0.029   
  (0.031)   
Return on Capital Employed (ROCE)
 §    0.025 
    (0.043) 
Trust (region)
§§  -0.226  0.310 
  (0.457)  (0.580) 
Hierarchical (region)
 §§  -0.356  -0.301 
  (0.266)  (0.423) 
Log (employment)   0.099***  0.073** 
  (0.025)  (0.031) 
Listed  -0.042  0.060 
  (0.075)  (0.106) 
Log (Age of firm), in years  0.021  0.029 
  (0.028)  (0.034) 
Multinational subsidiary  0.118**  0.125** 
  (0.051)  (0.056) 
Days from the start of the survey until firm contacted
§  -0.087***  -0.101** 
  (0.023)  (0.041) 
Country is China  -1.465***  n/a 
  (0.444)   
Country is France  0.886***  0.837*** 
  (0.219)  (0.247) 
Country is Germany  0.902***  1.109*** 
  (0.171)  (0.216) 
Country is Greece  0.512*  0.468 
  (0.275)  (0.382) 
Country is India  0.583***  n/a 
  (0.218)   
Country is Italy  0.955***  0.859** 
  (0.276)  (0.359) 
Country is Japan  -0.123  n/a 
  (0.207)   
Country is Poland  0.726**  0.470 
  (0.286)  (0.402) 
Country is Portugal  0.905**  1.016** 
  (0.369)  (0.445) 
Country is Sweden  0.929***  0.597** 
  (0.236)  (0.256) 
Country is United Kingdom  0.114  Baseline 
  (0.105)   
Country is United States  Baseline  n/a 
Number of firms  6,679  4,308 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy for a completed interview. All columns estimated by probit with robust standard errors 
in parentheses (marginal effects reported). All columns include a full set of 44 interviewer dummies, and 142 three digit industry 
dummies.  The dependent variable takes value one if the firm was interviewed, and zero if the interview was refused, or if 
scheduling was still in progress as the end of the project. In column (2) firms are dropped if Return on Capital Employed data is 
available. § Coefficient and standard-errors multiplied by 100. §§ Refers to region where the company is headquartered. 
Regressions weighted by the share of World Values Survey respondents in the region in the country. 
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TABLE A8 
WORLD VALUES SURVEY SAMPLE 
 
WVS Wave  1981–1984  1989–1993  1994–1999  1999–2004  Total 
           
China  0  983  1,064  0  2,047 
France  0  939  0  1,560  2,499 
Germany  1,084  2,893  1,956  1,937  7,870 
Greece  0  0  0  4.972  4.972 
India  0  2,365  1,769  1,898  6,032 
Italy  0  1,931  0  1,946  3,877 
Japan  1,099  911  990  1,254  4,254 
Poland  0  1,709  0  1,059  2,768 
Portugal  0  1,149  0  975  2,124 
Sweden  0  944  0  974  1,918 
United Kingdom  0  1,440  1,073  921  3,434 
United States  0  1,764  1,458  1,188  4,410 
            
Total  2,183  17,028  8,310  13,712  41,233 
 
Notes: Number of respondents used to build regional trust and religion aggregates by country and World Values Survey wave. Data 
relative to Greece are built from the ESS, using all available waves between 2000 and 2005.  
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TABLE B1 
IMPLIED INDUSTRY DECENTRALIZATION  
 
Dependent variable: 
implied industry decentralization  
       
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
Trust (region)  0.157**  0.100**  0.100***  0.095 
Trust measured in plant's region of location  (0.043)  (0.029)  (0.031)  (0.073) 
Rule of Law (country)      0.027**   
(-2.5=low, 2.5=high)      (0.014)   
         
Observations  98  98  98  98 
Regional controls  no  yes  yes  yes 
Country dummies  no  no  no  yes 
         
 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable is “implied industry 
decentralization,” measured as the industry share of employment in each region by SIC2 multiplied by that 
decentralization value for that SIC2 industry in the United Kingdom. The regression sample is all countries except the 
United Kingdom. Hence, a high value indicates a large share of employment in the region in industries which are 
decentralized in the United Kingdom. Estimation by OLS with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. TRUST 
measures the percentage of individuals in the region’s country of location who agreed with the statement “most people 
can be trusted.” RULE OF LAW measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of 
crime and violence in the firm’s country of location. The index is compiled by the World Bank (Kauffman et al., 
2007), and ranges between -2.5 and 2.5. REGIONAL CONTROLS are GDP per capita, population in the region, 
Research and Development expenditure in the region, and the % of employees with a degree. 
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TABLE B2: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS ON THE DECENTRALIZATION REGRESSION 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 





















Trust   0.608***  0.824***  0.940**  1.009***  0.578**  0.363*  0.528**  0.628*** 
Trust measured in HQ 
region/country of location 
(0.220)  (0.293)  (0.462)  (0.351)  (0.225)  (0.184)  (0.232)  (0.230) 
CIVIC 
     
0.036 
                (0.024)         
AUTONOMY          0.091       
          (0.230)       
N  3655  2316  1339  3439  3507  3655  3655  3472 
Country of CHQ 
location controls (2)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country of plant 
location dummies (11)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region of plant location 
controls (2)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry dummies (148)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Other controls (56)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Clustering  CHQ location  CHQ location  CHQ location  CHQ location  CHQ location  CHQ location  CHQ location  CHQ location 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable is the decentralization z-score index, measured by plant manager’s 
autonomy over hiring, investment, products, and pricing. Estimation by OLS with robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered by the firm’s 
headquarter region of location (country of origin if the plant belongs to a foreign multinational). TRUST measures the percentage of individuals who agreed with 
the statement “most people can be trusted” in the firm’s headquarter region of location (country of origin if the plant belongs to a foreign multinational). CIVIC is 
derived from the WVS and measures the average leniency towards “uncivil” behavior in the region of plant location (country of origin if the plant belongs to a 
foreign multinational, see text for details). AUTONOMY is derived from the WVS and measures the taste for autonomy in the region of plant location (country of 
origin if the plant belongs to a foreign multinational, see text for details). In Column 6 TRUST is measured using only the latest wave of the WVS available for the 
region of plant location (country of origin if the plant belongs to a foreign multinational). In Column 7 TRUST is measured using only the wave of the WVS with 
the largest number of observations available for the region of plant location (country of origin if the plant belongs to a foreign multinational). “Country of CHQ 
location controls” are the log of GDP per capita and population in the country of CHQ location. “Region of plant location” controls are the log of GDP per capita 
and population in the region where the plant is located. “Industry dummies” are 3 digits SIC dummies. “Other controls” include a dummy for whether the firm is 
publicly listed, a dummy for whether the CEO is on the same site as the plant (“CEO onsite”), and “Noise controls” (these include 44 interviewer dummies, 6 
dummies to control for the day of the week the interview took place, an interview reliability score, the manager’s seniority and tenure, and the duration of the 
interview. Regressions weighted by the share of World Values Survey respondents in the region in the country, with the weight set to one if the plant belongs to a 
foreign multinational.   63 
TABLE B3: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS ON THE DECENTRALIZATION REGRESSION: 
ALTERNATIVE FUNCTIONAL FORMS OF THE DECENTRALIZATION MEASURE 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 





























  OLS  OLS  OLS  Tobit
#  OLS  OLS  Probit  OLS 
   
           
 
Trust   0.608***  0.562***  0.681**  1.408***  0.053  0.600*  0.122***  0.340** 
Trust measured in HQ 
region/country of location 
(0.220)  (0.208)  (0.309)  (0.461)  (0.263)  (0.312)  (0.043)  (0.156) 
                  N  3655  3260  3260  3260  3260  3260  2882  3655 
Country of CHQ 
location controls (2)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country of plant 
location dummies (11)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region of plant location 
controls (2)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry dummies (148)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Other controls (56)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Clustering  CHQ location  CHQ location  CHQ location  CHQ location  CHQ location  CHQ location  CHQ location  CHQ location 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable in column 1 is the decentralization z-score index, measured by plant manager’s 
autonomy over hiring, investment, pricing, and product introduction. The dependent variables in columns 2–6 are the individual questions for autonomy over hiring, investment, 
pricing, and product introduction. The dependent variable in column 7 is a dummy taking value one if the firm appears to be in the 25
th top percentile for all individual autonomy 
questions. The dependent variable in column 8 is the decentralization z-score index, measured by plant manager’s autonomy over hiring, pricing, and product introduction. 
Estimation by OLS with robust standard errors in parentheses in all columns, except for column 4 which is estimated by Tobit, and column 7 estimated by Probit (marginal effects 
reported in both columns). Standard errors clustered by the firm’s headquarter region of location (country of origin if the plant belongs to a foreign multinational). TRUST measures 
the percentage of individuals who agreed with the statement “most people can be trusted” in the firm’s headquarter region of location (country of origin if the plant belongs to a 
foreign multinational). “Country of CHQ location controls” are the log of  GDP per capita and population in the country of CHQ location. “Region of plant location” controls are the 
log of GDP per capita and population in the region where the plant is located. “Industry dummies” are 3 digits SIC dummies. “Other controls” include a dummy for whether the firm 
is publicly listed, a dummy for whether the CEO is on the same site as the plant (“CEO onsite”), and “Noise controls” (these include 44 interviewer dummies, 6 dummies to control 
for the day of the week the interview took place, an interview reliability score, the manager’s seniority and tenure, and the duration of the interview.. Regressions weighted by the 
share of World Values Survey respondents in the region in the country, with the weight set to one if the plant belongs to a foreign multinational.  
#Coefficient and standard error in column 4 have been rescaled dividing by 10,000. 
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TABLE B4: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS ON THE DECENTRALIZATION REGRESSION:  
INCLUDING ADDITIONAL “GRAVITY” VARIABLES IN THE REGRESSIONS USING BILATERAL TRUST 
Dependent variable: Decentralization  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Sample  Foreign MNEs  Foreign MNEs  Foreign MNEs  Foreign MNEs 
Estimation method  OLS  OLS  IV  IV 
Bilateral trust  1.662**  1.649*  2.385**  3.736** 
Trust of people from country of origin to country of location  (0.804)  (0.910)  (1.106)  (1.453) 
Distance    -0.021 
 
-0.049 
Log(geographical distance between HQ and plant location 
country) 
  (0.109)    (0.094) 
Geographical contiguity    -0.338* 
 
-0.436** 
Dummy=1 if country of origin and location are contiguous    (0.200)    (0.189) 
Colony    0.481* 
 
0.603** 






At least 9% speaks same language in country of origin & location     (0.273)    (0.217) 
Legal Origin    0.075 
 
-0.053 
Dummy=1 if at country of origin and location share legal origin    (0.218)    (0.205) 
N  422  422  422  422 
Country of CHQ location controls (2)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country of plant location dummies (11)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region of plant location controls (2)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry dummies (23)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Other controls (56)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region of plant location dummies (111)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country of CHQ country location dummies (32)  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Clustering  CHQ by plant location  CHQ by plant location  CHQ by plant location  CHQ by plant location 
Instruments     
Somatic dist.  Somatic dist. 
Religious dist.  Religious dist. 
First stage F-test      18.19  8.03 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. Dependent variable is the decentralization z-score index. All columns include only foreign multinationals for which the bilateral 
trust data is available. Instruments are “religious diversity” and “somatic distance” between each country pair. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by country within 
each country origin by country of location cell. BILATERAL TRUST measures the percentage of people from country of origin who report to “trust a lot” people living in the 
country of firm’s location. “Country of CHQ location controls” are the log of GDP per capita and population in the country of CHQ location. “Region of plant location” 
controls are the log of GDP per capita and population in the region where the plant is located. “Industry dummies” are 2 digits SIC dummies. “Other controls” include a dummy 
for whether the firm is publicly listed, a dummy for whether the CEO is on the same site as the plant (“CEO onsite”), and “Noise controls.” Regressions weighted by the share 
of World Values Survey respondents in the region in the country, with the weight set to one if the plant belongs to a foreign multinational. CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
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